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I. INTRODUCTION 
A decade ago, my colleague Clark Kelso and I organized a symposium 
focused on reforming California’s sentencing practice and policy.1 The event led 
to a paper with contributions from a number of prominent scholars describing a 
blueprint for reforming California’s sentencing scheme.2 Buoyed by what seemed 
 
*  Distinguished Professor of Law, Director, Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution, University of 
the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; B.A., Swarthmore College, J.D., University of Pennsylvania. 
Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; University of Pennsylvania, 
J.D. 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A. 1969. I want to extend special thanks to McGeorge’s Dean Mootz for 
supporting this symposium and to my colleague Clark Kelso for his efforts towards meaningful reform of 
California’s prison system.  I am extremely appreciative of the other participants in this symposium.  Finally, I 
want to thank my research assistants Andrew Crouse, Tiffany Hiramine and Teal Miller for their excellent 
research efforts. 
1.  Michael Vitiello & Clark Kelso, A Proposal for a Wholesale Reform of California’s Sentencing 
Practice and Policy, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 903 (2004). Co-authors Erwin Chemerinsky, Kevin Reitz, Jonathan 
Turley, and Franklin E. Zimring. 
2. Id. at 908–09. 
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to be an incipient movement towards wholesale sentencing reform, we cited 
several factors pointing towards meaningful reform, including California’s 
budget crisis; prominent national figures and organizations proposing reform; the 
apparent willingness of then-Governor Schwarzenegger to take on the California 
Corrections and Peace Officers Association and to consider sentencing reform; 
and changing attitudes among Californians, suggesting their support for reform.3 
Had you asked us a decade ago whether reform would take ten years, we 
would have said no. Despite that, a decade later, we remain committed to the 
goal of sentencing reform and believe that California still has a reasonable 
chance of effectuating that reform. That is the focus of this symposium. 
This paper offers a brief overview of developments over the past decade 
leading to overuse of incarceration. Thereafter, it explores the role that various 
participants will have in the process, with an assessment of their role in 
advancing or blocking reform that may lead to reform. Specifically, Part II 
provides a snapshot of developments nationally.4 Part III focuses on California 
and discusses the role of the three-judge panel in Brown v. Plata5 and Coleman v. 
Schwarzenegger6 that forced California to respond to the overuse of 
incarceration.7 Part IV focuses on the various actors, including the federal judges, 
the legislature, governor, prison guard’s union, and the public, and assesses their 
roles in reform.8 As I believed a decade ago, sentencing reform is sound policy 
and, despite a long gestation, it can happen in California. But reform is not 
inevitable. Further, as developed briefly, the way in which law is made in 
California poses risks for successful reform.9 
II. ENTHUSIASM FOR INCARCERATION WANES 
Anyone interested in learning about incarceration in the United States does 
not have to look far for literature describing the trend from the 1970s through the 
early part of this century.10 Apart from a host of scholarly articles11 and books,12 
 
3. Id. at 908. 
4. Infra Part II. 
5. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
6. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F.Supp. 2d 882 (2009). 
7. Infra Part III 
8. Infra Part IV 
9. Infra Part V 
10. JUST. POL’Y INST., THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL ESTIMATES AT THE MILLENNIUM 1 
(2000), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/00-05_rep_punishingdecade_ac.pdf (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review); DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV., 
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE FUTURE 7–9 (2001), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/189106-2.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); John 
Conyers, Jr., The Incarceration Explosion, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 377, 377 (2013); NICOLE HAHN RAFTER 
& DEBRA L. STANLEY, PRISONS IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 15–19 (1999). 
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non-partisan organizations like the American Bar Association13 and the Pew 
Charitable Trusts14 have studied the trend that has made the United States the 
largest prison system in the world.15 Most recently, the National Academy of 
Sciences published a major report entitled The Growth of Incarceration in the 
United States: Causes and Consequences, which provides an extensive analysis 
of the problem of mass incarceration.16 The story is a familiar and troubling one. 
 
11. Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality, and the Future of Mass 
Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 851–52, 858 (2009); David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass 
Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L., 27, 28 (2011); see Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population 
Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980–1996, 26 CRIME & JUST. 17, 18 (1999) (noting an increase in incarceration by 6.3 
percent per year since the early 1970s). 
12. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN 
CALIFORNIA 16–17 (2001); DAVID GARLAND, MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
(2001); TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED 
NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 5 (2007). 
13. Press Release, American Bar Association, California Officials to Discuss Prison Conditions, 
Sentencing and Rehabilitation Issues with American Bar Association Commission (Apr. 2, 2004), http:// 
www.abanews.org/releases/news040204.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Press Release, 
American Bar Association, Incoming ABA President Dennis W. Archer Calls on Lawyers to Evaluate Nation’s 
Prison and Corrections System (Aug. 11, 2003), http://www.abanews.org/aug03/081103_3.html (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review); Press Release, American Bar Association, ABA Forms New Commission to 
Review Mandatory Minimum Sentences, Prison Conditions and Pardons (Oct. 6, 2003), http://www.abanet.org/ 
media/oct03/100603_1.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
14. PEW CTR. ON STS.,STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS 1 (2011), 
available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/State_Recidivi
sm_Revolving_Door_America_Prisons%20.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
15. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., NAT’L RES. COUNS., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 2 (Jeremy Travis, et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter THE GROWTH OF 
INCARCERATION]. 
16. Id. At least one commentator has been critical of some aspects of the report. Professor John Pfaff of 
Fordham University School of Law is skeptical about the basis on which the NAS report makes its conclusions. 
John Pfaff, The Problematic National Research Council’s Report on Incarceration: Some Initial Thoughts, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (May 28, 2014), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/05/the-problematic-national-
research-councils-report-on-incarceration-some-initial-thoughts.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
He points to discrepancies, including the reliance on data relating to increased incarceration for drug crimes. Id. 
He points out that “drug offenses” is an incredibly broad category, one that is as broad as violent crimes, a 
category that has been broken up into narrower categories including murder, sexual assault, assault, and 
robbery. Id. Professor Pfaff’s point is that if the data from each of these smaller categories were lumped into 
“violent crimes” then the growth of that category would be more on par with the drug offenses category. Id. 
Furthermore, Pfaff argues that the number of violent crimes played a larger role in prison population increases 
than did drug offenses. Id. 
Pfaff also takes issue with the assertion in the NAS report that longer prison sentences are at the heart of 
the population increase. John Pfaff, A Flawed NRC Report: Prison Populations and Sentence Length, Parts 1-4, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (May 30, 2014), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/05/a-flawed-nrc-report-
prison-populations-and-sentence-length-part-1.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Relying on his 
own research, Pfaff argues that the perspective taken by the NAS report is too simplistic and that the focus on 
longer sentences is overstated. Id. While Professor Pfaff might disagree about the underlying causes of the 
significant increase in prison populations, he does not contest the fact of massive incarceration. Id.  
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Beginning in the 1970s with the loss of faith in rehabilitation, states and the 
United States abandoned indeterminate sentencing.17 While a consensus formed 
across political boundaries, those calling for longer sentences ended up winning 
the debate in legislatures throughout the United States.18 The prison population 
rose steadily and dramatically from roughly 200,000 prisoners nationwide to over 
a million and a half between 1973 and 2009.19 Add to that another 700,000 
prisoners housed in jails; the total population incarcerated peaked at about 2.5 
million.20 That amounts to about a quarter of the world’s prison population and, 
measured as a percentage of the population, is 5 to 10 times the rate of 
incarceration in Western Europe.21 
The impact on minority communities in the United States is even more 
dramatic. African-American and Hispanic men less than 40 years old are 
disproportionately represented among those incarcerated.22 They are incarcerated 
at rates far greater than non-Hispanic white men.23 
The causes of mass incarceration are easy to identify as well: incarceration 
became increasingly the remedy of choice when an offender was arrested and 
convicted;24 legislatures lengthened sentences even before they adopted three 
strikes legislation in the 1990s;25 legislatures adopted mandatory minimum 
sentences;26 during the 1990s, a majority of states adopted some form of three 
strikes law;27 and most states adopted “truth-in-sentencing” laws, largely 
abandoning early release for those offenders.28 
For years, politicians became addicted to get-tough-on-crime legislation.29 
Richard Nixon demonstrated the power of a law-and-order campaign in 1968, 
with its veiled racist theme.30 The first President Bush demonstrated the staying 
 
17. Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1013 (1991). 
18. Michael Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration: Why is California Lagging Behind?, 28 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1275, 1279–80 (2012) [hereinafter Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration]. 
19.  THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 15, at 2. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 3. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. ZIMRING, ET AL., supra note 12, at 159; Vitiello,supra note 18, at 1281. 
28. THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 15, at 73. 
29. See Joan Petersilia & Francis T. Cullen, Liberal but Not Stupid: Meeting the Promise of Downsizing 
Prisons, 2 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming Winter 2014–2015) (manuscript at 6) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review); see also Michael Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case: The Supreme Court 
Restores Democracy, 30 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1601, 1610, 1631 (1996) [hereinafter Vitiello, Three Strikes]. 
30. THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 15, at 115–16. 
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power of that approach with the Willie Horton ad during the 1988 campaign.31 
But tough-on-crime was hardly restricted to conservatives or politicians playing 
the race card. Few politicians in California, for example, have been willing to 
take the lead on meaningful sentencing reform.32 
As indicated above, even before the recession, various individuals and 
organizations began focusing on the overuse of incarceration.33 Many focused on 
the social cost, especially to minority communities.34 Some commentators 
focused on the poor allocation of resources resulting from mass incarceration.35 
Consistent with the best deterrence studies, scholars argued that society gets 
better deterrence from increasing the certainty of punishment than from using 
those resources to increase punishment.36 Commentators recognized that longer 
sentences, especially for older offenders, had a perverse effect: those offenders 
would be incarcerated long-past their prime crime years.37 In a world of finite 
resources, warehousing older offenders left fewer resources for younger, more 
violent offenders.38 Not only did warehousing older offenders skew the prison 
population away from more violent offenders, it added to the cost of providing 
care for inmates: older prisoners are far more expensive to warehouse because of 
added medical expenses.39 
Elsewhere, some policymakers who advocated sentencing reform, no doubt, 
were motivated by these legitimate policy reasons. In many states, even before 
 
31. DANIEL M. SHEA & BRIAN M. HOWARD, PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS DECODED 172 (2013); Willie 
Horton Political Ad 1988, YOUTUBE (uploaded on Oct. 27, 2006), available at https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=EC9j6Wfdq3o (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
32. Vitiello, Three Strikes, supra note 29, at 1610. 
33. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text. 
34. THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 15, at 14. 
35. CORR. INDEP. REV. PANEL, INTRODUCTION TO REFORMING CALIFORNIA’S YOUTH AND ADULT 
CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM 19 (2004), available at http://www.cpr.ca.gov/reports/indrpt/corr/index.htm (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
36. ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF 
RECENT RESEARCH (1999); Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal 
Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 865 
(2001); VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENT’G PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING 
CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 1 (2010), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/ 
deterrence%20briefing%20.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING 
JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 40–41 (1976); see, e.g., HAW. ST. JUDICIARY’S OPPORTUNITY 
PROBATION WITH ENFORCEMENT (HOPE) PROGRAM, http://www.hopehawaii.net (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
37. CAL. PERFORMANCE REV. INMATE/PAROLEE POPULATION MANAGEMENT (2007), available at 
http://www.cpr.ca.gov/reports/indrpt/corr/index.htm [hereinafter INMATE/PAROLEE POPULATION] (on file with 
the McGeoorge Law Review); THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 15, at 345. 
38. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
395, 440–41 (1996). From an institutional standpoint, prison administrators and guards would not object to that 
trend. Managing older prisoners represents different but less dangerous challenges to prison personnel. 
39. Id. 
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the recession of 2007, states experienced budget difficulties.40 A number of states 
faced a crisis by overuse of incarceration and responded by reforming their 
sentencing law, often in tandem with the creation of sentencing commissions and 
sentencing guidelines.41 
The recession accelerated the interest in prison reform.42 Obviously, states 
were under increasing strain caused by the recession.43 Further, crime was no 
longer a top priority among voters.44 The correlation between incarceration and 
decline in crime rates is complex, with increased incarceration having some, but 
limited effect on reduced crime.45 But beginning in the 1990s and continuing until 
today, crime rates are lower in many jurisdictions than they have been since the 
1970s.46 That makes sentencing reform politically more palatable than it has been 
in years. 
Sentencing reform has been possible in many places outside of California 
because a political consensus has developed across political lines. Elsewhere, I 
have described that consensus.47 Anyone who doubts that should visit the website 
Right on Crime.48 More recently, prominent Republican politicians, including 
probable Presidential candidate Rand Paul, have sounded the knell for sentencing 
reform.49 Less surprisingly, Attorney General Eric Holder has also called for 
reform.50 
Not only has the call for reform picked up support across the political 
spectrum, but reform has taken place in many states. Some of those states are 
deep red states, like Texas51 and Georgia.52 Those states have implemented a 
 
40. See Charlie Savage, Trend to Lighten Harsh Sentences Catches On in Conservative States, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/13penal.html?_r=3&hpw (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
41. Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 18, at 1286–87. Typically, the goals for 
commissions included reducing reliance on incarceration as the only response to crime, thereby reducing prison 
costs, and using existing resources more effectively for violent offenders, thereby protecting the public without 
continuous prison construction. Id. 
42. Petersilia & Cullen, supra note 29, at 2. 
43. Id.  
44. Id. at 7. 
45. THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 15, at 4; ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 12, at 155. 
46. THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 15, at 46–47. 
47. Vitiello, supra note 18, at 1281. 
48. See generally Statement of Principles, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-
conservative-case-for-reform/statement-ofprinciples/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). 
49. Senator Rand Paul Leading the Way on Criminal Justice Reform, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www. 
rightoncrime.com/2013/04/senator-rand-paul-criminal-justice-reform/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2014) (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review). 
50. Carrie Johnson, With Holder in the Lead, Sentencing Reform Gains Momentum, NPR (Aug. 7, 2013, 
4:22 AM), available at http://www.npr.org/2013/08/07/209253516/with-holder-in-the-lead-sentencing-reform-
gains-momentum (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
51. Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration, supra  note 18, at 1291–94. 
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variety of programs to reduce incarceration, for example, by reforming their 
probation and parole systems,53 and to reduce recidivism, for example, by 
adopting stepped-up reentry programs for inmates released from prison.54 More 
liberal states have also engaged in sentencing and other reforms, with an aim 
towards reducing reliance on prisons while maintaining public safety.55 States 
like New York, for example, revisited mandatory minimum sentences.56 New 
York went further when it applied the new law retroactively.57 The federal 
government joined this trend in 2008 with the adoption of the Second Chance 
Act, which increased funding for reentry programs,58 and later with passage of the 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced the disparity in sentencing between 
crack and powder cocaine offenses.59 
In 2007, America’s prison and jail populations peaked at over 2.4 million 
offenders.60 Not surprisingly, the recession contributed to a downturn in the total 
number of incarcerated offenders nationwide, a downward trend that has 
continued since 2009.61 
Sentencing reform does not necessarily correlate with a total reduction in a 
state’s prison population. Although many states have engaged in some kind of 
sentencing reform, not all have experienced a reduction in their prison 
populations.62 Indeed, as reported by the Sentencing Project, three states account 
for the largest percentage of reductions in the number of offenders behind bars.63 
I deal with California in more detail below. Between 1999 and 2012, New York 
and New Jersey reduced their prison populations by 26%; nationwide, the prison 
population grew by 10% during that period of time.64 
 
52. MICHAEL P. BOGGS & W. THOMAS WORTHY, REPORT OF THE GEORGIA COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE REFORM 2 (2014). 
53. Id. at 8–9; Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration, supra  note 18, at 1291–93. 
54. Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration, supra  note 18, at 1291–92.; BOGGS & WORTHY, supra note 
52, at 3–4. 
55. Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration, supra  note 18, at 1287–89; see THE GROWTH OF 
INCARCERATION, supra note 15, at 345. 
56. RAM SUBRAMANIAN & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. JUST., PLAYBOOK FOR CHANGE?: STATES 
RECONSIDER MANDATORY SENTENCES 14 (2014), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/ 
resources/downloads/mandatory-sentences-policy-report-v3.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
57. Id. 
58. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified in scattered sections 
of 18 and 42 U.S.C.). 
59. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 
841). 
60. Petersilia & Cullen, supra note 29, at 2. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 3 
63. MARC MAUER & NAZGOL GHANDOOSH, THE SENT’G PROJECT, FEWER PRISONERS, LESS CRIME: A 
TALE OF THREE STATES 1 (2014), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Fewer_ 
Prisoners_Less_Crime.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
64. Id. 
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Despite predictions by some law-and-order advocates,65 the reduction in 
prison population has not led to rising crime rates. According to a policy brief 
published by The Sentencing Project, crime rates in New York and New Jersey 
have dropped at a faster rate than the national average.66 As reported by The 
Sentencing Project, “[b]etween 1999-2012, New York and New Jersey’s violent 
crime rate fell by 31% and 30%, respectively, while the national rate decreased 
by 26%.”67 Those states experienced similar declines in property crimes, also 
below the national average.68 
While states like New York and New Jersey have better than average results, 
they are part of a national trend. According to a Pew Charitable Trusts’ report, 
more than half of the states reduced prison populations between 2007 and 2012.69 
Not only are states reducing prison population, but many are reducing overall 
prison capacity, with several states closing prisons.70 No doubt economics have 
driven many of these reform efforts.71 
Although states vary in their approach, systemic reform seems to have taken 
hold. As Professors Petersilia and Cullen have pointed out, “[t]hese trends were 
reflected in prison policy.”72 That is, while economics may have motivated 
reform efforts, policymakers have changed their beliefs on reform. As mentioned 
above, that includes conservatives who no longer depict prison “as an essential 
weapon in the war on crime but as a ‘blunt instrument’ that, when used 
injudiciously, wasted valuable taxpayer monies.”73 Again, as observed by 
Professor Petersilia and Cullen, we have reached the “tipping point” towards a 
new way of thinking about incarceration: “For so long, mass imprisonment had 
been the governing policy of corrections . . . . [S]eemingly overnight, its 
hegemony was shattered, and downsizing quickly emerged as its replacement.”74 
 
65. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1967 (2011) (Alito dissenting). 
66. MAUER & GHANDOOSH, supra note 63, at 2. 
67. Id. at 1. 
68. Id. 
69. Press Release, The Pew Charitable Trusts, US Imprisonment Rate Continues to Drop Amid Falling 
Crime Rates (March 14, 2043), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/press-
releases/2014/03/14/us-imprisonment-rate-continues-to-drop-amid-falling-crime-rates (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
70. NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENT’G PROJECT, ON THE CHOPPING BLOCK 2013: STATE PRISON CLOSURES 
1 (2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_On%20the%20Chopping%20Block 
%202013.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
71. States spent $48.5 billion on corrections in 2010, a 5.6% reduction since 2009. TRACEY 
KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T JUST., STATE CORRECTIONS EXPENDITURES, FY 1982-2010 1 (2012), , available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scefy8210.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
72. Petersilia & Cullen, supra note 29, at 4. 
73. Id. at 4–5. “In 2012, the Platform for the Republican Party for the first time explicitly embraced 
prisoner rehabilitation, reentry programs, and restorative justice; it also rejected the federal government’s 
overcriminalization of many acts.” Id. at 5. 
74. Id. 
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This good news begs a question: what about California? While we seem to be 
in the midst of a national trend towards sustained reform, the picture in California 
is more complicated. That is the topic of the next Part of this paper. 
III. BUCKING THE TREND? 
According to The Sentencing Project, California has done a good job in 
reducing its prison population and reducing crime.75 Between 2006 and 2012, it 
reduced its prison population by 23%.76 During that period, its violent crime rate 
dropped 21%, exceeding the national decline.77 Its decline in property crimes was 
almost as good as the national average.78 That would seem like good news. The 
picture is much more complicated and efforts at reform have been tepid by 
comparison to many other states. This Part reviews briefly how California got 
into its prison overcrowding crisis and how it has made progress and why no one 
should announce victory: the modest reforms mask significant problems that may 
erode the gains made thus far and California has not adopted reforms that 
promise more significant benefits than we have achieved with modest reforms. 
Unresolved is whether California will take the next step towards meaningful 
reform. 
The story of California’s overcrowding crisis is a familiar one.79 As part of a 
national trend, California abandoned indeterminate sentencing in 1976.80 That 
reflected the shift in penological philosophy from rehabilitation to retribution, 
with its emphasis on punishment.81 The shift was away from offender 
characteristics to the offense as determinative of the length of the sentence, with 
judges given an option between three presumptive sentences for each crime.82 
California law required the judge to impose the middle range sentence unless the 
judge found mitigating or aggravating circumstances justified a modification of 
the middle range penalty.83 Without other changes, the determinate sentencing 
scheme would have led to an increase in the state’s prison population. But the 
legislature did not stop there. 
 
75. MAUER & GHANDOOSH, supra note 63, at 7. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 4. 
78. Id. at 5. 
79. See, e.g., Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration, supra  note 18, at1281; Petersilia & Cullen, supra 
note 29, at 2. 
80. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 1, at 919. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 920. 
83. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West 2004). 
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As described by one commentators, the California legislature created 
numerous “drive by” sentencing laws.84 Thus, when a particularly heinous crime 
made the nightly news, the legislature added an enhancement provision to the 
law, leading to so many sentencing provisions that many lawyers and judges 
have been forced to use a computer program to determine the correct sentence.85 
Over a seven-year period, from 1984 through 1991, the legislature passed over 
1,000 crime bills, with many of them enhancing criminal sentences.86 
And the trend towards enhanced sentences does not include California’s 
Three Strikes law.87 As the authors of Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes 
and You’re Out in California stated, the Three Strikes law was “the largest penal 
experiment in American history.”88 The third strike provision got most of the 
national headlines: while California was part of a national trend during the 1990s, 
its three strikes provisions were the most draconian. For example, the list of 
qualifying felonies included not just violent offenses but also residential 
burglary.89 Further, the law included no washout provision; thus, an offender 
whose violent or serious felonies were in the distant past remained eligible for a 
sentence of 25 years to life.90 Finally, the most extreme provision was the section 
of the law dealing with the third felony, making an offender eligible for the 
enhanced sentence: it could be any felony.91 Several extreme examples made 
national headlines, involving what seemed to the public to be a very minor 
offense, but triggering a lengthy sentence that seemed disproportionate to the 
third crime.92 In several instances, the offender’s third strike was petty theft with 
a prior theft offense.93 Under California law, such an offense was a “wobbler,” 
one that could be treated as a felony if the prosecutor so chose.94 
 
84. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 1, at 916–17. 
85. Id. at 923 n.88. 
86. Id. at 921. 
87. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2) (West 1994). 
88. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 12, at 17 (capitalization omitted). 
89. Cal. Penal Code § 667 (West 1994); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS, SAM KAMIN, 
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 7 (2001). 
90. Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 
400 (1996). 
91. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS, SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE 
STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 7 (2001). 
92. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2) (West 1994); See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2002). Gary 
Ewing was arrested for stealing three golf clubs worth $399 each. He was charged with felony grand theft of 
personal property, and as his “third strike” was sentenced to 25-years in prison. In the companion case, Leandro 
Andrade stole $153 worth of videotapes from two separate Kmart stores. Because Andrade stole from two 
separate locations he was charged with two third strikes and sentenced to 50 years in prison. Ina Jaffe, Cases 
Show Disparity of California’s 3 Strikes Law, NPR, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Oct 30, 2009, 5:54 PM),  
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114301025 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
93. E.g. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
94. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18 (2002). 
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Were that all that California’s Three Strikes law did, it would have added 
modestly prison overcrowding.95 But the law also includes a “two strikes” 
provision that expands and mandates prison time for anyone who was convicted 
of a serious or violent felony: the law doubles the second strike offender’s 
punishment.96 While much of the press coverage and scholarly debate has focused 
on the third strike provisions of the law,97 the second strike provision had a more 
dramatic effect on the prison population: for example, in 2013, there were fewer 
than 9000 third strike offenders in state prison, but over 34,000 second strike 
offenders.98 
By the mid-2000s, California’s prison population was about 170,000.99 As 
described in Brown v. Plata, dealing with two prisoners’ class action suits against 
the state, by the time of trial in that case, the prison population was 156,000, 
nearly double its design capacity.100 
The cost of maintaining California’s prison system ballooned over time as 
well. During fiscal year 2010, California spent almost $8 billion on its prison 
system at an average cost of almost $48,000 per inmate.101 That same year, 
California budgeted about $1 billion more for its prison system than for higher 
education.102 
Academic commentators and various organizations expressed concern over a 
long period of time.103 Occasionally, legislators conducted hearings on reforming 
 
95. As of June 2013 the total number of inmates in prison for a third strike was 8,064. In some instances 
the offender’s third strike would have commanded a long sentence anyway. For example, 57 third strikers’ final 
offense was murder in the second degree. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB., SECOND AND THIRD STRIKER 
FELONS IN THE ADULT INSTITUTION POPULATION (June 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/offender_information_services_branch/Quarterly/Strike1/STRIKE1d1
206.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
96. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1994). 
97.  Marisa Lagos, Two strikes have large impact on prison population, SFGATE (July 31, 2011), 
http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Two-strikes-have-large-impact-on-prison-population-2352565.php (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
98.  CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB., SECOND AND THIRD STRIKER FELONS IN THE ADULT INSTITUTION 
POPULATION (June 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/offender_information_services_branch/Quarterly/Strike1/STRIKE1d1
206.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
99. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 908 (2009). 
100. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011) 
101. VERA INST. OF JUST., THE PRICE OF PRISONS CALIFORNIA: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS 
TAXPAYERS FACT SHEET (2012), http://www.vera.org/files/price-of-prisons-california-fact-sheet.pdf (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
102. See Prerena Anand, Winners and Losers: Corrections and Higher Education in California, 
CACS.ORG (Sept. 5, 2012), available at http://cacs.org/research/winners-and-losers-corrections-and-higher-
education-in-california/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
103. Letter from Michael E. Alpert, Chairman, Little Hoover Commission, to Gray Davis, Governor of 
California and Members of the Legislature (Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/ 
lhcdir/172/report172.pdf (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see Robert Salladay, Governor’s 
 
2014 / Reforming California Sentencing Practice and Policy 
696 
sentencing practices. For example, at various times, the legislature had before it 
proposals to adopt a sentencing commission.104 Those proposals went nowhere.105 
In 2003, a select Senate committee conducted hearings on the aging prison 
population, including testimony about the high cost of maintaining an aging 
prison population and about the experience in other states that had put in place 
early release programs for older prisoners.106 As indicated above,107 some change 
has come to California, but it was not the result of legislative will. Instead, 
incentive came from the federal court system. 
In 1990, attorneys for mentally-ill prisoners brought a class action against the 
state in which the plaintiffs contended that the delivery of mental health care 
services was so poor that it amounted to a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.108 Initially, a federal magistrate 
found for the plaintiffs, a decision that the federal district court largely adopted in 
September 1995.109 
Among the court’s finding was that the prison system lacked a program for 
screening and evaluating inmates for mental illness, leading to “'thousands of 
inmates suffering from mental illness [who] [were] either undetected, untreated, 
or both.'”110 Additionally, “‘defendants’ supervision of the use of medication 
[was] completely inadequate; prescriptions [were] not timely refilled, there [was] 
no adequate system to prevent hoarding of medication, . . . inmates on 
psychotropic medication [were] not adequately monitored, and it appear[ed] that 
some very useful medications [were] not available because there [was] not 
enough staff to do necessary post-medication monitoring.’”111 
These, and other unconstitutional conditions, were attributed to a chronic 
understaffing of mental health care services.112 Due to these findings, the 
Coleman court entered an order for injunctive relief appointing a Special Master 
to oversee the development and implementation of plans to remedy the 
constitutional violations.113 
 
Tough Task: Finding the Waste to Cut, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 27, 2003, at A1; see also George Skelton, Millions of 
Micro-Managers Share Blame for State’s Crises, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at B8. 
104. Amanda Lopez, Coleman/Plata: Highlighting the Need to Establish an Independent Corrections 
Commission in California, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 97, 114 (2010). 
105. Id. 
106. California’s Aging Prison Population, Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on the Cal. Corr. System 
of the Cal. S. Comm. on Pub. Safety, 2003-2004 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003). 
107. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
108. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 898 (2009). 
109. Id. at 899. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 900. 
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In December 1995, the court appointed a Special Master to oversee remedial 
phase of action.114 After 18 months the Special Master submitted the Mental 
Health Services Delivery System Program Guides to the court.115 This program 
guide included a report, remedial plans, and policies and procedures to be 
implemented.116 The court approved the plan.117 Between 1997 and 2006 the 
special master submitted 20 monitoring reports and 56 other reports to the 
court.118 The subsequent history was one of small gains followed by reversals of 
those gains.119 After a decade of remedial work: 
[T]he state had made some progress but still had not met its 
constitutional obligation to provide Coleman class members with 
adequate mental health care. . . . Worse, two monitoring reports filed by 
the Coleman Special Master in 2006 reflected a troubling reversal in the 
progress of the remedial efforts of the preceding decade and 
demonstrated the profound impact of population growth on the state’s 
ability to meet its constitutional obligations to seriously mentally ill 
inmates.120 
After years of litigation, Coleman would merge with another class action suit 
and end up in the Supreme Court.121 
Plata v. Schwarzenegger was filed in 2001 as a class action on behalf of 
inmates in California’s prisons. The complaint alleged constitutional violations in 
the delivery of medical care as well as violations of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).122 These violations included: 
inadequate medical screening of incoming prisoners; delays in or failure 
to provide access to medical care, including specialist care; untimely 
responses to medical emergencies; the interference of custodial staff with 
the provision of medical care; the failure to recruit and retain sufficient 
numbers of competent medical staff; disorganized and incomplete 
medical records; a ‘lack of quality control procedures, including lack of 
physician peer review, quality assurance and death reviews’; a lack of 
protocols to deal with chronic illnesses, including diabetes, heart disease, 
hepatitis, and HIV; and the failure of the administrative grievance system 
 
114. Id. 
115. Id.  
116. Id.  
117. Id. at 901. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 906. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 914. 
122. Id. at 890.  
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to provide timely or adequate responses to complaints concerning 
medical care.123 
During the proceedings, numerous cases of gross negligence surfaced. For 
example, with regard to one case involving a prisoner with a serious heart 
condition, a medical expert stated that the improper care was "the most reckless 
and grossly negligent behavior [he had] ever seen by a physician.124 
The Plata plaintiffs agreed to a stipulation for injunctive relief. Under this 
agreement, the state was ordered to implement on a staggered basis new policies 
and procedures, numbering 800 pages contained in 11 volumes.125 Seven prisons 
were to have these procedures implemented immediately with completion in 
2003. Each subsequent year policies were to be implemented at five additional 
prisons so that implementation would be achieved statewide by 2008.126 
The stipulation required that California prisons provide just the minimum 
level of medical care required under the Eighth Amendment and the policies and 
procedures aimed to “meet or exceed the minimum level of care necessary to 
fulfill the defendants’ obligation to plaintiffs under the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.”127 
The stipulation required regular audits of the defendant’s compliance. They 
were to include a review of at least 180 inmate medical records at each prison. 
Compliance required assessments and treatment plans in the records be consistent 
with the community standard of care “imposed under the laws of the State of 
California upon health care providers licensed to practice in California.”128 
"[M]inimally adequate death reviews" were also necessary for compliance.129 
The state failed to follow through on its promises. For example, by May 
2005, when twelve prisons should have been in compliance with the plan, “not a 
single prison ha[d] successfully completed implementation.”130 Inaction by the 
state eventually led the district court to appoint a receiver after the court held a 
six day hearing.131 The court’s findings were sharply critical of the health care 
system. The court found that the system created an “unconscionable degree of 
suffering and death [that] is sure to continue if the system is not dramatically 
overhauled.”132 
 
123. Id.  
124. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2005 WL 2932253, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
125. Coleman, 922 F.Supp. 2d at 891. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 891, 894. 
131. Id. at 894. 
132. Id. at 895. 
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Despite the appointment of a receiver with broad powers over the prison 
health care system, conditions worsened as the prison population increased from 
about 162,000 to over 170,000 in 2007, or 200% of design capacity for the 
system.133 The deteriorating conditions led Governor Schwarzenegger to issue an 
emergency proclamation declaring that “all 33 of CDCR’s prisons are now at or 
above maximum operational capacity, and 29 of the prisons are so overcrowded 
that the CDCR is required to house more than 15,000 inmates in conditions that 
pose substantial safety risks.”134 Following the proclamation, the plaintiffs moved 
for the appointment of a three-judge panel to limit the size of the prison 
population in light of the recognition that overcrowding was directly related to 
the poor health care conditions.135 
At about the same time, the plaintiffs in Coleman also filed a motion for 
appointment of a three-judge panel.136 After the appointment of a three-judge 
panel in both cases, the cases were consolidated.137 In 2009, after additional 
hearings, the three-judge panel entered an order requiring the state to reduce its 
population to 137.5% of the system’s design capacity.138 That required a 
reduction of between 38,000 and 46,000 prisoners. The state appealed from the 
order of the three-judge panel.139 A divided Court affirmed the three-judge 
panel’s order.140 
During oral argument in Plata, Justice Kennedy summed up not just the 
majority’s position, but the past decade or more, when he stated “the problem . . . 
is that at some point the court has to say: You’ve been given enough time. . . ."141 
The Court’s decision largely ended the state’s foot-dragging.142 AB 109, a law 
that “realigns” California’s sentencing scheme, shifting responsibility from the 
state to counties, was California’s response to the demands of the three-judge 
panel to reduce its prison population.143 While the legislature passed the law 
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Plata and Coleman, a comparison with 
 
133. Joan Petersilia, California Prison Downsizing and Its Impact on Local Criminal Justice Systems, 8 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 327 (2014). 
134. Coleman, 922 F.Supp. 2d at 912. 
135. Id. at 912–13. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 914. 
138. Id. at 1003–04. 
139. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922 (2011). 
140. Id. at 1923. 
141. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
142. For example, it moved for an extension of time to hit the target, something that the three-judge panel 
agreed to. Bob Egelko, Court Gives California Two Years to Lower Prison Population, SFGATE (Feb. 11, 
2014), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Court-gives-California-2-years-to-lower-prison-5221828.php (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
143. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(b) (West 2014). 
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the lower court opinions and the statute suggest that the law’s drafters had the 
litigation in mind.144 
Enacted in April 2011, the law had three goals: reducing recidivism; 
reducing costs associated with the prison system; and maintaining public 
safety.145 The law did not involve release of felons currently in state prison.146 
Instead, it changed the law to reduce the number of felonies requiring offenders 
to spend time in state prison.147 Most non-violent and low-level felons are now 
sentenced to county jail time when the court orders the offender incarcerated for 
all or part of his term.148 The effect of the law has been to slow the flow of 
offenders to the state’s prisons.149 One piece of datum demonstrates why that is 
so: counties now handle drug and property crimes. That shift represents over half 
of all felony convictions in a given year.150 
In theory, Realignment does more than merely move offenders from state 
prisons to county jails. Instead, its goal was to address sources of overcrowding. 
California spends more than any other state on its prison system, but has a much 
higher rate of recidivism. As summarized by Professor Petersilia, “No other state 
spends more on its corrections system and gets back less.”151 Realignment 
attempts to reduce recidivism expanding resources for rehabilitation. Meanwhile, 
the goal of reducing recidivism is entwined with efforts to reduce prison costs: 
“The purpose of justice reinvestment is to manage and allocate criminal justice 
populations more cost-effectively, generating savings that can be reinvested in 
evidence-based strategies that increase public safety while holding offenders 
accountable.”152 
The law was premised on the idea that moving prisoners closer to home 
makes rehabilitation more likely. Offenders are closer to their families and 
community-based programs can deliver services more efficiently at the local 
level.153 Consistent with the theme of local responsibility, the law requires each 
 
144. See Petersilia, supra note 133, at 327. 
145. PENAL § 17.5(a)(1)–(7). 
146. Petersilia, supra note 133, at 336. 
147. Id. 
148. PENAL § 17.5(a)(6). More specifically, “Felons convicted of certain serious, violent, and aggravated 
sex offenses continue to serve their time in state prison, but sentences for more than five hundred other felony 
crimes must be served through county jail time or probation.” Petersilia, supra note 133, at 332. 
149. Petersilia, supra note 133, at 328. 
150. CAL. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 2010 53 tbl.40 (2001), available at http://www.oag. 
ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cjsc/publications/candd/cd10/preface.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
151. Joan Petersilia, California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, in CRIME AND 
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 207, 211 (Michael Tonry ed., 2008). As she observed elsewhere, “despite the 
state’s extraordinary spending on prisons, its return-to-prison recidivism rate is among the nation’s highest at 
57.8%, far outpacing the national average of 43.3%.” Petersilia, supra note 133, at 332. 
152. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17.5(a)(7), 3450(b)(7) (West 2014). 
153. See id. §§ 17.5, 1228–1232. 
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county to create a Community Corrections Partnership to develop a 
comprehensive plan to implement the goals of Realignment.154 But the law left 
counties with broad discretion in how to implement the goals of the law. In 
effect, San Francisco County is free to adopt policies discouraging the use of jails 
while San Bernardino County is free to use resources made available under the 
law to build more jail cells.155 Anticipating savings to the state from the reduction 
in the prison population, the legislature allocated a part of those savings to the 
counties, a change that is now guaranteed by the state Constitution as a result of 
Proposition 30.156 
Realignment deserves a closer look at this point. Some commentators have 
called it a bold innovation. For example, the Economist called it “one of the great 
experiments in American incarceration policy.”157 Not surprisingly, Governor 
Brown, its chief proponent, has called it “bold.”158 The law has resulted in an 
immediate reduction in the prison population by reducing the number of 
offenders going to state prisons.159 
The reduction in prison admissions is historic and dramatic. As indicated 
above, the total prison population has been declining in recent years.160 In fact, 
over half of the nationwide reduction in the prison population in recent years 
resulted from reductions in the prison population in California.161 No doubt, the 
progress made under Realignment led the three-judge panel to grant the 
Governor an extension of time to comply with its order to reduce the population 
to 137.5% of capacity.162 
In light of the immediate reduction in the prison population, what is not to 
like about Realignment? Its proponents point to its larger goals, not simply as a 
short term compliance with the court order. Among the goals of the legislation is 
 
154. Id. §§ 17.5(a)(6), 1230(b). 
155. Id. § 1230(b)(3); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 30026(a) (West 2012) (Counties are only required to 
use funds to make “various changes to the criminal justice system”); see also PENAL § 17.5(a)(6) (Counties are 
instructed to “develop[] programs and ensur[e] appropriate outcomes” for offenders). The law also shifts 
responsibility from state parole officials to county probation officers for supervising low-level offenders 
released from state prison, a change from prior practice. Id. § 3451(c). The law also prohibits the return to 
prison for most parolees and probationers who commit “technical” violations of their release. Id. §§ 3457–3458. 
156. AB 109, 2011 Leg., 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011); see also Cal. Proposition 30 (2012). 
157. The Magic Number, THE ECONOMIST (May 11, 2013), http://www.economist.com/ news/ united-
states/21577411-california-hasnt-emptied-its-prisons-enough-it-trying-magic-number (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
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http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/state&id=8375360 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
159. Id.; MIKE MALES, CTR. JUV. & CRIM. JUST., EIGHT MONTHS INTO REALIGNMENT: DRAMATIC 
REDUCTIONS IN CALIFORNIA’S PRISONERS 1 (2012), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports/docs/ 
External-Reports/Realignment_update_ June_2012.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
160. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
161. Petersilia, supra note 133, at 333. 
162. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 
2013 Deadline, Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK/DAD (PC) (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014). 
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to help end recidivism. As stated in the law, “the purpose of justice reinvestment 
is to manage and allocate criminal justice populations more cost-effectively, 
generating savings that can be reinvested in evidence-based strategies that 
increase public safety while holding offenders accountable.”163 That sounds good, 
as do other aspirational aspects of the law.164 
Some observers herald the shift of responsibility to local governments.165 And 
Realignment certainly did shift responsibility away from Sacramento. Thus, each 
county must create a community corrections partnership, involving the various 
“stakeholders.” The panel must create a plan to implement the law.166 The state 
has promised funds to the counties, but, consistent with the preference for local 
control, counties are largely free to spend the funds as the local government sees 
fit.167 That may mean spending funds on alternatives to incarceration or it may 
mean using the funds for expanding local jails.168 Not surprising given the diverse 
political climates around the state, counties are spending Realignment funding in 
widely different ways.169 
Whether Realignment can deliver over the long term is less certain. No 
doubt, incarceration in county jails is less expensive than in state prisons.170 But 
depending on how high-incarceration counties respond, the net effect of 
Realignment may be moving prisoners from state to local facilities without 
achieving the grander goal of reducing recidivism.171 Indeed, while some reports 
 
163. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17.5(a)(7), 3450(b)(7) (West 2014). 
164. For example, the law was designed to support “locally run community-based corrections.” Id. § 
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168. See SARA ABARBANEL ET AL., STAN. CRIM. JUST. CTR., REALIGNING THE REVOLVING DOOR: AN 
ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA COUNTIES’ AB 109 2011–2012 IMPLEMENTATION PLANS 32 (2013) (on file with the 
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MONEY: HOW CALIFORNIA COUNTIES ARE SPENDING THEIR PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT FUNDS 14 (2014), 
available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/183091/doc/slspublic/Lin%20Money% 
20Final%20Report%20022814.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
169. SARA ABARBANEL ET AL.,supra note 168; LIN & PETERSILIA, supra note 168. 
170. See KIM GILHULY ET AL., HUM. IMPACT PARTNERS, REHABILITATING CORRECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA: 
THE HEALTH IMPACTS OF PROPOSITION 47 14 (2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (comparing the 
cost per person in prison versus jail). 
171. Certainly, part of the drop in the state prison population corresponded to an increase in county jail 
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state prison population drop was shifted onto the counties. MAGNUS LOFSTROM & STEVEN RAPHAEL, PUB. 
POL’Y INST. OF CAL., IMPACT OF REALIGNMENT ON COUNTY JAIL POPULATIONS 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.ppic.org/content/ pubs/report/R_613MLR.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). That is, 
roughly two-thirds of the drop in the state prison population represents an actual reduction in California’s 
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point to the decline in California’s prison population, the total number of 
offenders in some form of incarceration has not dropped nearly as sharply,172 
given the increased populations in county jails173 and given the number of 
prisoners that California has shipped out of state, to reduce cost and population in 
its state prisons.174 Realignment is simply a shell game if it merely moves 
prisoners elsewhere. 
The three-judge panel supervising the state’s health care system has all but 
said that Realignment is a Band-Aid. In its February 10, 2014 order granting the 
state additional time to comply with the order to reduce the prison population to 
137.5% of capacity, they stated that: 
In the four and a half years between our 2009 order and the date of this 
opinion, defendants have instituted only one significant measure to 
relieve overcrowding in California’s prisons: “Realignment,” . . . . Apart 
 
overall in-state incarceration rate, according to the PPIC report. Id. However, this still does not take into 
account prisoners sent out of state, meaning that the number of prisoners incarcerated by the state has not 
dropped nearly as much as is suggested by the drop in California’s in-state incarceration rate. See infra note 174 
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inmates that were shifted from state prisons to county jails, per the PPIC report, and nearly 17,000 of the 26,600 
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with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Realignment so far has not reduced the total number of offenders under 
some form of correctional supervision. Instead, it merely shuffled the allocation of responsibility. . . .”). 
173. See TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 
2012-STATISTICAL TABLES 1–2 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim12st.pdf (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that, while the rest of the country’s jail population remained stable 
between 2011 and 2012 [Realignment took effect October 1, 2011], California’s jail population rose 
substantially during that period, growing by an estimated 7,600 inmates); see also Petersilia, supra note 133, at 
348 (“In the quarter preceding the start of Realignment, the average daily jail population [in California] was 
71,293 but by yearend 2012 it reached 80,136, an increase of approximately 11%.”); SARAH LAWRENCE, STAN. 
CRIM. JUST. CTR., MANAGING JAIL POPULATIONS TO ENHANCE PUBLIC SAFETY: ASSESSING AND MANAGING 
RISK IN THE POST-REALIGNMENT ERA 6 (2013), available at https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/ 
files/child-page/440504/doc/slspublic/Paper%20on%20jail%20mgmt %20July%202013.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (“Under . . . Realignment, tens of thousands of sentenced individuals who previously 
would have served time in state prison are now serving it in county jails.”). 
174. Victoria Law, California Ships Prisoners Out of State to “Reduce” Its Prison Population, TRUTH-
OUT.ORG (Dec. 6, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/20405-california-ships-prisoners-out-
of-state-to-reduce-its-prison-population (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The three-judge panel 
overseeing the reduction of California’s prison population has expressed its disapproval of sending prisoners out 
of state. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 
2013 Deadline at 2, Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK DAD (PC) (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014), available 
at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3jp-Feb-2014/Three-Judge-Court-opinion-2-20-2014.pdf [hereinafter 
Order Request for Extension] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“sending . . . prisoners to out-of-state 
facilities . . . is neither durable nor desirable. It would result in . . . prisoners being incarcerated hundreds or 
thousands of miles from the support of their families, and in hundreds of millions of dollars that could be spent 
on long-lasting prison reform being spent instead on temporarily housing prisoners in out-of-state facilities.”). 
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from Realignment, defendants have taken no significant steps toward 
reducing the prison population and relieving overcrowding despite 
repeated orders by this Court requiring them to do so. 
Reading between the lines is not difficult: Realignment is a halfway measure. 
In addition, Realignment is premised on the idea that counties will develop 
best-practices. That is, because counties are free to experiment, counties with 
poor results will emulate counties that are more successful in reducing 
recidivism.175 But as several others involved in this symposium will argue, 
California does not have to invent best practices in recidivism.176 California has 
suffered from high recidivism177 not because better practices are not available but 
because of its adherence to failed practices.178 Under the current approach, some 
counties where law-and-order still resonates are likely to follow old habits, using 
incarceration of a solution of first resort.179 Adherence to failed policies is likely 
to result in the continued disparate impact on minority communities.180 Governor 
 
175. MAGNUS LOFSTROM ET AL., PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF 
CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT ON PUBLIC SAFETY 15–19 (2012), available at 
http://www.ppic.org/ content/pubs/report/R_812MLR.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
176. See, e.g., Richard L. Harris & Susan F. Mandiberg, Alcohol- and Drug-Free Housing: A Key Strategy 
in Breaking the Cycle of Addiction and Recidivism, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
177. MAGNUS LOFSTROM ET AL., PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., IS PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT 
REDUCING RECIDIVISM IN CALIFORNIA? 2 (2014), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_ 
614MLR.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“California has had one of the highest recidivism rates 
in the nation for more than a decade.”). 
178. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF CAL., PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT: CALIFORNIA AT A 
CROSSROADS 15 (2012), available at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/california_aclu_ 
public_safety_realignment _california_at_a_crossroads_2012.pdf [hereinafter CALIFORNIA AT A CROSSROADS] 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“ . . . as the legislature acknowledged in enacting AB 109, continually 
increasing our capacity to incarcerate over the past 30 years has simply not worked.”); see also Bernice Yeung, 
California DOC Report Looks at Recidivism Rates, CORRECTIONS ONE (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www. 
correctionsone.com/re-entry-and-recidivism/articles/2865158-California-DOC-report-looks-at-recidivism-rates 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
179. See W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not Drive 
California Counties’ Incarceration Rates—And Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 987, 991–92 (2012) 
(discussing counties’ differing views on how to respond to crime, including how much to rely on incarceration); 
see also CALIFORNIA AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 178, at 11 (“A danger inherent in the wide latitude the state 
has given counties to implement realignment is that the counties that have historically sent disproportionate 
numbers of people to state prison will focus their realignment implementation efforts on increasing their jail 
capacity to incarcerate more people at the local level.”). 
180. See CALIFORNIA AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 178, at 21–22 (discussing disparate outcomes 
defendants experience due to race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status); see also Paige St. John, Early Jail 
Releases Have Surged Since California’s Prison Realignment, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-ff-early-release-20140817-story.html (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (“Time served varies considerably around the state—a situation that UC Berkeley law professor 
Barry Krisberg called ‘justice by geography.’”); see also Elliott Currie, “Realigning” Criminal Justice in 
California: Real Reform, or Shifting the Deck Chairs?, DISSENT (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.dissentmagazine. 
org/online_articles/realigning-criminal-justice-in-california-real-reform-or-shifting-the-deck-chairs (on file with 
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Brown’s claim that Realignment was bold may have been too self-
congratulatory. Certainly, it was a different approach than the approach of most 
other states that have reformed their sentencing schemes and reduced their prison 
populations.181 But a bolder solution might have been one that required more 
assertive leadership: the governor could have proposed legislation that would 
have adopted best practices for all 58 counties.  
Finally, anecdotally, local governments have not been able to adjust 
successfully to the influx of detainees. According to an article in the Los Angeles 
Times, “Across California, more than 13,500 inmates are being released early 
each month to relieve crowding in local jails – a 34% increase over the last three 
years.”182 While local officials attempt to release low-risk offenders, the Times 
reported that “an analysis of jail data has found that incarceration in some 
counties has been curtailed or virtually eliminated for a variety of misdemeanors, 
including parole violations, domestic violence, child abuse, drug use and driving 
under the influence.”183 
At least according to law enforcement, early release has emboldened some 
offenders. Again according to a parole agent quoted by the Times, “‘Every day 
we get guys who show up in the lobby, stoned out of their minds . . . I’ll have 15 
arrested, and 12 to 14 will be released immediately.”184 Occasionally, offenders 
on release commit headline violent crimes, the kinds of crimes that may erode 
popular support for sentencing reform.185 
Thus, the result of Realignment has been a patchwork of programs dependent 
on local officials, some of whom are overwhelmed by overcrowded jails and 
limited resources, even with added funding from the state. Many counties lack 
the political will to adopt best practices, proven elsewhere to reduce recidivism 
and costs.186  
 
the McGeorge Law Review) (contrasting harsh conditions in disadvantaged areas, such as Oakland, with much 
better conditions in cities like San Diego). 
181. Currie, supra note 180 (comparing California’s realignment plan with the wholesale reforms made in 
other states, like New York, New Jersey, and Michigan, in order to reduce prison populations). 
182. St. John, supra note 180. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. See, e.g., id. (discussing the case of Sidney DeAvila, a convicted sex offender who repeatedly 
violated parole, but was continually released due to overcrowding; after being released on one occasion, he 
raped and killed his 76-year-old grandmother). 
186. Professor Doug Berman at Ohio State Law School provides readers of his blog with articles and 
stories from around the country. Douglas A. Berman, SENT’G. L. & POL’Y BLOG, http://www.sentencing. 
typepad.com (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Headline after headline and article after article tout 
reforms that are working elsewhere. Id.; see, e.g., Andrew Knittle, Most Oklahoma Inmates Granted Early 
Release Since March Have Stayed Out of Trouble, OKLAHOMAN (Oct. 8, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://newsok. 
com/most-oklahoma-inmates-granted-early-release-since-march-have-stayed-out-of-trouble/article/5349523 (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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Newt Gingrich published an op-ed in September, 2014, entitled What 
California Can Learn From the Red States on Crime and Justice.187 Apart from 
the hint of a gloating tone,188 Gingrich’s op-ed covers themes that liberals have 
advanced for years about the lack of rehabilitation services, including drug 
treatment, about the high recidivism rates, a result of failing to follow proven 
alternatives to current practices.189 
Gingrich’s op-ed highlights two points: a broad consensus has emerged 
across the political divide that favors sentencing reform.190 Voters agree.191 It also 
reflects the view that California lags behind. Only through the continued pressure 
of the three-judge panel has California come this far.192 While arguably the jury is 
still out on whether Realignment is a long-term solution to prison overcrowding 
and excessive spending on incarceration as the primary response to crime, some 
observers doubt that California has found the right solution.193 
 
187. Newt Gingrich & B. Wayne Hughes, Jr., What California Can Learn from the Red States on Crime 
and Punishment, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014, 5:27 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0917-
gingrich-prop--47-criminal-justice-20140917-story.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
188. The focus on the success that red states have had ignores the role of conservative and Republican 
politicians, including Ronald Reagan and George W.H. Bush, in getting California in the incarceration mess 
that it is now in. See Jeralyn Merritt, Reagan’s Drug War Legacy, ALTERNET (June 18, 2004), 
http://www.alternet.org/story/18990/reagan%27s_drug_war_legacy (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(“As a result of these flawed drug policies initiated by then President Reagan . . . the number of those 
imprisoned in America has quadrupled to over 2 million.”); Press Release, Drug Policy Alliance, Friday: 25th 
Anniversary of President George H.W. Bush’s Infamous Oval Office Speech Escalating “War on Drugs,” (Sept. 
4, 2014), http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2014/09/friday-25th-anniversary-president-george-hw-bushs-
infamous-oval-office-speech-escalatin (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that in 1989, George 
H.W. Bush said, “[W]e need more jails, more prisons, more courts and more prosecutors,” contributing to the 
mass incarceration crisis). Indeed, Gingrich does not acknowledge his own role in the problem. See, e.g., NEWT 
GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (1994), available at www.gvpt.umd.edu/jgloekler/documents/ 
contract.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (calling on Republican legislators to “take back” 
America’s streets by enacting tougher truth-in-sentencing legislation, funding new prison construction, and 
providing additional funding for law enforcement agencies, among other measures); see also ON THE ISSUES, 
NEWT GINGRICH ON DRUGS, http://www.ontheissues.org/2012/Newt_Gingrich_Drugs.htm (last updated May 
31, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that Gingrich called in 1998 for increased penalties 
for selling drugs).  
189. Gingrich & Hughes, supra note 187.  
190. Vitiello, Three Strikes, supra note 18, at 1281–86. 
191. See Emily Ekins, Poll: 77% of Americans Favor Eliminating Mandatory Minimum Prison Sentences 
For Nonviolent Offenders; 73% Favor Restoring Voting Rights, REASON.COM (Oct. 21, 2014, 8:45 AM), 
http://reason.com/poll/2014/10/21/poll-77-of-americans-favor-eliminating-m (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
192. See Dan Walters, Realignment Has Reduced California Prison Population, But What About Other 
Effects?, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 11, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/ 
dan-walters/article2585691.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (implying that it was pressure from 
the three-judge panel that motivated the enactment and implementation of Realignment). 
193. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF CAL., CALIFORNIA PRISON REALIGNMENT ONE-YEAR 
ANNIVERSARY: AN AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ASSESSMENT 1 (2012), available at https://www.aclunc. 
org/docs/criminal_justice/realignment_packet.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Realignment 
alone will not be sufficient to address California’s incarceration crisis.”). 
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My view that California has yet to achieve wholesale reform should be 
obvious. For reasons explored above – e.g., the confluence of a national 
consensus favoring reform,194 the continuing pressure from the three-judge 
panel,195 and emerging data about effective alternatives to incarceration196 – this 
may be the best opportunity for California to join the national trend towards 
reform. But as explored in the next Part, whether California will do so is not a 
foregone conclusion.197 
IV. ASSESSING THE PLAYERS 
In Liberal But Not Stupid, Professors Petersilia and Cullen raise concerns 
whether California can sustain meaningful reductions in its prison population.198 
They remind readers about past failures where good intentions have not been 
enough to bring about promised results. For example, the mental health 
“deinstitutionalization” movement, high on promise but low on performance, has 
resulted in increased incarceration of mentally ill offenders, with few 
opportunities for treatment.199 Their article then focuses on a series of principles 
that reformers should follow.200 
While I endorse their reform prescriptions, here I want to consider another 
question: will California finally join the national trend and enact meaningful 
reform? In this Part, I look at various “stakeholders” who may advance or 
frustrate meaningful reform and assess the chances that the various parties will 
work towards meaningful reform.201 My conclusion is that California faces a big 
“if” because of some unique aspects of California’s political climate. At the end 
of the day, I remain cautiously optimistic that California can belatedly adopt 
wholesale sentencing reform. I begin with some of the participants who may 
make sentencing reform difficult and end by discussing the “good guys,” the 
participants in the system who may help effectuate change. 
 
194. Vitiello, Three Strikes, supra note 18, at 1281–86 and accompanying text. 
195. Supra Part III. 
196. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text. 
197. See infra Part IV. 
198. Petersilia & Cullen, supra note 29, at 1. 
199. Id. at 9–11. 
200. Id. at 30–33 (First, “set a hard limit” on its prison population; “[s]econd, take recidivism seriously” 
by developing a system of accountability for recidivism rates; “[t]hird, reaffirm rehabilitation,” placing 
community corrections “on equal footing with incarceration” and not merely viewing rehabilitation as a 
secondary, “alternative” goal; fourth, develop and “provide expert technical assistance” in downsizing prisons, 
to ensure that the nature of the problem is fully understood and addressed appropriately; and “[f]ifth, develop a 
criminology of [prison] downsizing,” building a knowledge base of which models for downsizing work best). 
201. Infra Part IV. 
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A. The Political Actors 
Elsewhere, a political consensus has spurred legislative reform in far less 
progressive states than California.202 One might naturally ask why Californians 
should not look to the governor and the legislature to create a long-term solution 
to the state’s sentencing policy and procedure. Thus far, there have been three 
reasons why legislative reform has not occurred and three potential barriers to 
meaningful reform: the governor, the Republicans, and the Democrats. 
1. The Governor 
As expected, Governor Brown has won reelection.203 He did so without 
breaking a sweat.204 Whether that bodes well for wholesale sentencing reform is 
an open question. 
In theory, the governor has agreed to “consider” a sentencing commission as 
part of a long-term solution to California’s prison crisis.205 But as yet another 
cliché goes, “the devil is in the detail.” Whether the governor supports wholesale 
reform is tricky: he has called Realignment a “bold” innovation.206 Can a 
politician change direction and admit, in effect, that his signature legislation is 
not so bold? Since his reelection, he has stated that he hopes to take on some big 
challenges.207 In one sense, that makes a lot of sense: this almost certainly is his 
swan song and he can think boldly about his legacy.208 
 
202. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text. 
203. OFF. OF DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2014, 
GENERAL ELECTION 19–21 (2014), available at http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2014-general/pdf/2014-
complete-sov.pdf [hereinafter STATEMENT OF VOTE] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
204. See id. (Governor Brown received 4,388,368 votes against his opponent’s 2,929,213); David Siders, 
Gov. Jerry Brown Wins Historic Fourth Term, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 4, 2014, 8:07 PM), http://www. 
sacbee.com/news/politics-government/election/article3568891.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(“Brown’s own race was so low-profile that he aired no TV ads identifying himself as a candidate for re-
election, and he spent the second-to-last weekend before Election Day on the East Coast, at a class reunion at 
Yale Law School . . . The outcome was never in question, with Brown leading Kashkari by double digit 
percentages in public opinion polls for the duration of the campaign.”). 
205. Opinion re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request for Extension of 
December 31, 2013 Deadline, Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK/DAD (PC) (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 10, 2014) (“. . . defendants have agreed to develop comprehensive and sustainable prison population-
reduction reforms, including considering the establishment of a commission . . .”). 
206. Smith, supra note 158. 
207. Seema Mehta, Jerry Brown Looks to Carry on his Family’s Legacy Building California, L.A. TIMES 
(Dec. 29, 2014, 6:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-jerry-brown-20141230-story.html 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing various challenges Brown plans to tackle, such as the 
high-speed rail project, tunnels to transport water around the state, and a climate change initiative). 
208. Siders, supra note 204 (noting that the 2014 election was likely Brown’s last, and speculating on 
what the governor will do in his final term to cement his legacy). 
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Governor Brown has also promised to work with Republicans in achieving 
solutions to California’s problems.209 As discussed below, with regard to 
sentencing reform, he may have little success in lining up Republican votes.210 
2. The Republicans 
Thus far, the Republicans in the California legislature have shown little 
interest in wholesale sentencing reform. Quite the opposite: they have attempted 
to position themselves to take advantage if Realignment fails. California’s 
Republican lawmakers were uniformly opposed to Realignment; every 
Republican assembly member211 and every Republican state senator212 voted 
against AB 109. Since then, Republicans in the legislature have introduced bill 
after bill aimed at weakening Realignment.213 
In addition to their attempts to repeal or dilute Realignment legislatively, 
Republicans in the Senate and Assembly have engaged in a fierce public relations 
campaign against the reform effort. For instance, the Assembly Republican 
Caucus’s website has posted numerous articles chronicling what it calls the 
“chilling” and “tragic” results of Realignment--anecdotes of released felons who 
were under local supervision pursuant to AB 109 and went on to commit violent 
crimes.214 The site also contains a number of posts minimizing the economic 
benefits of Realignment and arguing that the program has been a financial 
disaster.215 On the Senate side, the Senate Republican Caucus’s web site contains 
 
209. GOVERNOR JERRY BROWN, INAUGURAL ADDRESS AT THE CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY, Jan. 5, 
2015. In Governor Brown’s remarks, he spoke about how “far reaching” and important realignment is as a 
reform, and he commented that “over the next four years - and beyond - we must dedicate ourselves to making 
what we have done work,” possibly suggesting a lack of interest in implementing any additional reforms. Id. 
210. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
211. ASSEMBLY FLOOR VOTE ON AB 109, 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_01010150/ab_109_vote_20110317_0532PM_asm_floor.html 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also ASSEMBLY REPUBLICAN CAUCUS, CAL. CRIME WATCH, 
WHAT IS PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT? (2011), available at http://arc.asm.ca.gov/CaCrime 
Watch/?p=realignment (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Assembly Republicans fought hard against 
[AB 109] . . .”). 
212. SENATE FLOOR VOTE ON AB 109, 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at http://www. 
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_109_vote_20110317_0334PM_sen_floor.html (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
213. See, e.g., Jack Barnwell, Fuller Joins State GOP’s Charge to Change AB 109, MTSHASTA 
NEWS.COM (Mar. 21, 2013, 5:17 PM), http://www.mtshastanews.com/article/20130321/News/ 130329915 (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing how Republican legislators introduced 13 pieces of legislation 
in a single day, all aimed at scaling back Realignment). 
214. See, e.g., ASSEMBLY REPUBLICAN CAUCUS, CAL. CRIME WATCH, AB 109’S MOST WANTED (2011), 
http://arc.asm.ca.gov/CaCrimeWatch/?p=wanted [hereinafter AB 109’S MOST WANTED] (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (providing links to news articles about various convicted felons who allegedly harmed 
new victims as a result of AB 109). 
215. ASSEMBLY REPUBLICAN CAUCUS, CAL. CRIME WATCH, HAS PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT SAVED 
THE STATE MONEY? (2012), http://www.arc.asm.ca.gov/BudgetFactCheck/?p_id=421 (on file with the 
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a variety of press releases and postings from Republican senators characterizing 
Realignment as “disastrous,”216 a “flawed policy,”217 and “a dangerous mess”218 
that voters should urge their representatives to repeal. 
Republican resistance to sentencing reform has not been limited to 
Realignment alone. Nearly every Republican legislator has consistently fought 
any attempt at reform, as evidenced by the response to SB 1010, also known as 
the Fair Sentencing Act, a bill put in the hopper earlier this year and signed into 
law by Governor Brown in September.219 The law eliminated the crack/powder 
cocaine sentencing disparity under California law.220 All the Republican state 
senators221 and 20 of the 25 Republican assembly members222 voted against SB 
1010, despite overwhelming support for and negligible opposition to the bill by 
stakeholders and interest groups.223 This is just one in a long line of proposed 
sentencing reform measures that have been opposed by the vast majority of 
California’s Republican lawmakers. 
 
McGeorge Law Review) (downplaying the budgetary savings attributed to Realignment by the Legislative 
Analyst’s Office and arguing that CDCR’s claim that Realignment would save money failed to take into 
account additional funds that local communities would need to expend). 
216. Press Release, Senator Jim Nielsen, The Disastrous Effects of One Year of AB 109 Realignment, 
(Oct. 9, 2012), http://district4.cssrc.us/content/disastrous-effects-one-year-ab-109-realignment-0 (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review) (calling Realignment a failure that “has victimized hundreds of individuals” and 
arguing for its immediate repeal).  
217. Press Release, Senator Jean Fuller, Protecting Public Safety with Realignment Reform: Legislation 
to Address Flawed Policy, (Mar. 19, 2013), http://district16.cssrc.us/content/protecting-public-safety-
realignment-reform (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (claiming that “Realignment has caused crime to 
rise in our neighborhoods and continues to put Californians at risk.”). 
218. Press Release, Senator Jim Nielsen, Realignment is a Dangerous Mess, (Nov. 23, 2011), 
http://district4.cssrc.us/content/realignment-dangerous-mess (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (referring 
to AB 109 as “a reckless proposal” that “condone[s] deviant behavior” and harms victims of crime). 
219. California Adopts Fair Sentencing Act (SB 1010): Equalizes Penalties for Certain Crack and 
Powder Cocaine Offenses, THE SENT’G PROJECT (Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/detail/news.cfm?news_id=1876 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
220. Chris Roberts, California Cops Still Fighting Crack Sentencing Reform, SFWEEKLY.COM (June 17, 
2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2014/06/17/california-cops-still-fighting-crack-
sentencing-reform (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
221. SENATE FLOOR VOTE ON SB 1010, 2013-2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014), available at http://www.leginfo. 
ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_1001-1050/sb_1010_vote_20140821_0427PM_sen_floor.html (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
222. ASSEMBLY FLOOR VOTE ON SB 1010, 2013-2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014), available at http://www. 
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_1001-1050/sb_1010_vote_20140814_1030AM_asm_floor.html (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
223. See S. RULES COMM., B. ANALYSIS OF SB 1010, 2013-2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_1001-1050/sb_1010_cfa_20140815_093352_sen_floor.html 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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California’s Republican legislators have not only opposed sentencing reform 
in general.224 They have voiced support for even harsher sentencing laws.225 This 
trend shows no signs of ending anytime soon. Echoing the points that I made 
above, the San Jose Mercury published an article captioned Prison Realignment: 
Republicans Ought to be Leading, Not Opposing this Trend, in which the author 
stated, “the California Republican Party . . . [is] grossly out of step on crime 
relative to many conservatives around the country.”226 While Newt Gingrich 
exhorted Californians to vote yes on Proposition 47227 and governors like Texas 
Governor Rick Perry bragged about being “smart on crime,”228 California 
Republicans have seen little advantage in being part of the solution.229 
The 2014 election was not particularly good for the Republicans, who won 
no statewide office again.230 But gains in the legislature denied the Democrats its 
supermajority.231 Having regained some leverage in policy matters, including 
budgetary matters, could influence some Republicans to work towards 
responsible sentencing policy. At this point, one can only take a wait-and-see 
attitude whether Republicans will join the conversation. 
 
224. See generally, CALIFORNIA REPUBLICAN PARTY, PARTY ENDORSEMENTS (2014), http://cagop. 
org/about/party-endorsements (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (registering the state Republican Party’s 
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225. See, e.g., CAL. SENATE REPUBLICAN CAUCUS, SENATE REPUBLICAN FISCAL OFF., HIGHLIGHTS AND 
ANALYSIS OF THE 2012-13 BUDGET 34 (2012), available at http://cssrc.us/sites/cssrc.us/files/ 
120718_BudgetHighlights.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (advocating the construction of new 
prisons and suggesting that increasing spending on rehabilitative efforts will fail to produce results). 
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SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (July 18, 2013, 12:01 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_23680080/prison-
realignment-republicans-ought-be-leading-not-opposing (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The 
receptiveness of conservatives outside California to sentencing reform is evidenced by the work of the 113th 
Congress Task Force on Over-Criminalization, established by the House of Representatives Judiciary 
Committee and composed of both Democrats and Republicans. Rhonda McMillion, ABA Voices Concerns 
About the Impact of Over-Criminalization of U.S. Laws, ABA J. (Dec. 1, 2014, 5:20 AM), http://www. 
abajournal.com/magazine/article/aba_voices_concerns_about_the_impact_of_over_criminalization_of_us_laws 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The task force was established in May 2013 to explore how 
expanding the number of federal crimes have led to increased incarceration rates. Id. 
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228. Wesley Lowery, Conservatives Try to Make Criminal Justice Reform a Signature Issue, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/conservatives-try-to-make-criminal-justice-
reform-a-signature-issue/2014/03/07/4b006368-a626-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_story.html (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
229.  Percival, supra note 226. 
230.  STATEMENT OF VOTE, supra note 203, at 7. 
231. Jeremy B. White, No Senate Supermajority for California Democrats, Assembly Margin Still in 
Doubt, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 4, 2014, 9:27 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-
alert/article3578189.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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3. The Democrats 
Democrats do not have an especially good track record on sentencing reform. 
Over the past decade or more, they have had hearings on various proposals for 
reform.232 They have advanced some modest reforms, including The Fair 
Sentencing Act.233 But their signature response to prison overcrowding remains 
Realignment.234 
A few Democrats have shown an interest in wholesale reform.235 But as 
Professor Robert Weisberg has commented, California has been “the glaring 
outlier” when it comes to sentencing reform.236 Why have Democrats, who 
control a majority of both houses of California’s legislature, continually defeated 
efforts at creating a commission despite the support of academics, non-partisan 
organizations, and others? 
Legislation that would create a sentencing commission has been introduced 
in California’s legislature at least nine separate times since 1976.237 The 
legislature passed three bills but those bills were vetoed by Governors 
Deukmejian and Wilson.238 More recently, Assembly and Senate Democrats have 
failed to support sentencing commission proposals. Reviewing recent efforts that 
have failed may shed light on whether wholesale reform is possible today. 
In 2007, it appeared that Democratic lawmakers were serious about creating 
a commission. Two bills to establish a sentencing commission emerged, one in 
the State Senate and one in the Assembly.239 AB 160 passed in the Assembly; SB 
110 passed in the Senate.240 However, the bills failed to gather enough votes when 
they moved to the other house, and thus neither of the proposed commissions 
became a reality. 
 
232. See infra notes 237–53, 331 and accompanying text. 
233. See supra notes 219–20 and accompanying text. 
234. See California’s Continuing Prison Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/08/11/opinion/sunday/californias-continuing-prison-crisis.html?_r=0 (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
235. See, e.g., Ben Adler, New Push for Sentencing Reform After Latest Prisons Ruling, CAPITAL PUB. 
RADIO (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.capradio.org/articles/2014/02/11/new-push-for-sentencing-reform-after-
latest-prisons-ruling (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing how the chairs of the Senate and 
Assembly Public Safety Committees, both Democrats, desire wholesale sentencing reform).  
236. Robert Weisberg, How Sentencing Commissions Turned Out to Be a Good Idea, 12 BERKELEY J. 
CRIM. L. 179, 210 (2007). 
237. Kara Dansky, A Blueprint for a California Sentencing Commission, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 158, 158 
(2010). 
238. Carole D’Elia, The Politics of Public Safety Reform in California, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 144, 145 
(2010). 
239. Id.  
240. Id. 
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SB 110, which had received the votes of 24 of the 25 Democratic members 
of the Senate,241 received only 34 of the 47 possible Democratic votes in the 
Assembly--five Democratic Assembly Members abstained from voting, while 
eight Democrats actively voted against the bill.242 Similarly, AB 160, which 
received 43 of 48 Democratic votes in the Assembly,243 received only nine of the 
25 possible Democratic votes in the Senate244--mostly the Senate’s progressive 
members like Senators Migden and Kuehl.245 
One cause behind the defeat of these bills was infighting among Democratic 
legislators. While all four of the Assembly Members who voted against the 
Assembly bill were among the eight who voted against the Senate bill, the other 
four who voted against the Senate bill had voted for the Assembly bill. Thus, 
these four took inconsistent positions on the two bills.246 Why these lawmakers 
would support a sentencing commission in voting on one bill but not support a 
similar commission in voting on another bill can be explained by a grudge 
Assembly Democrats held against the Senate concerning one of the Senate’s 
committees.247 The Senate Public Safety Committee had put in place the 
Receivership Overcrowding Crisis Aggravation (ROCA) policy, under which any 
bills that could add to prison overcrowding were held in committee and not 
released to the Senate floor. ROCA had caused dozens of bills to stall.248 
Assembly Democrats angry over ROCA caused SB 110 to fail on September 7, 
2007; the Senate in turn defeated AB 160 five days later. 
Another explanation--at least, ostensibly--for the bills’ defeat was the 
argument that public safety should not be placed in the hands of unelected 
commissioners. Republicans and law enforcement groups had made this 
argument about the bills previously, even saying that the commission would be 
unconstitutional.249 Some Democrats claimed they voted against creating a 
 
241. SENATE FLOOR VOTE ON SB 110, 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007), available at http://www.leginfo. 
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leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0101-0150/sb_110_vote_20070907_0303PM_asm_floor.html (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review). 
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244. SENATE FLOOR VOTE ON AB 160, 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007), available at http://www. 
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_0151-0200/ab_160_vote_20070912_0104AM_sen_floor.html (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
245. Brian Leubitz, Remember Way Back in 2007 When the Assembly Supported a Sentencing 
Commission?, CALITICS (Aug. 25, 2009, 4:15 PM), http://www.calitics.com/diary/9925/remember-way-back-
to-2007-when-the-assembly-supported-a-sentencing-commission (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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247. D’Elia, supra note 238, at 145. 
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249. See, e.g., ASSEMB. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, B. ANALYSIS OF SB 110, 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007), 
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commission because they agreed with the law enforcement groups’ arguments.250 
Such explanations, though, may have been made to cover up the real reason for 
the Democrats’ opposition: animosity over the ROCA policy and other such 
infighting. 
In 2009 there was another effort to create a sentencing commission, this time 
in the Senate.251 The proposed legislation, which was endorsed by both Governor 
Schwarzenegger252 and Democratic leaders (but not the leaders of 
Schwarzenegger’s own party),253 passed the Senate. However, the bill failed to 
gain sufficient support from Democrats in the Assembly. Passage would have 
required 41 votes, but nearly a dozen Assembly Democrats--all of whom were 
either up for reelection or running for higher office such as Attorney General--
declined to support the sentencing commission.254 These Democrats felt pressure 
to appear tough on crime; they feared the wrath of law enforcement groups, 
which had been fiercely advocating against the creation of a commission.255 The 
 
comm.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (Argument in Opposition by the CDAA and Argument in 
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will take effect unless rejected by the Legislature.”); see D’Elia, supra note 238, at 146 (“ . . . it was very clear 
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LATIMES.COM (Aug. 20, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/20/local/me-prison20 (on file with the 
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Prison Population, KPBS.ORG (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2009/sep/01/sacramento-update-
reducing-calif-prison-population (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting John Myers, Sacramento 
Bureau Chief for The California Report) (“There aren’t any Republican supporters . . . either in the Senate or 
the Assembly.”). 
254. D’Elia, supra note 238, at 146. 
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Assembly ultimately did enact a prison bill, but it was heavily amended, omitting 
the sentencing commission and other key elements.256 Governor Schwarzenegger 
had strong words for the Assembly members who didn’t support the bill: they 
were “more worried about their safe seats, rather than their safe streets,”257 and 
that they didn’t “have the guts” to enact a sentencing commission, which the 
governor said the state badly needed.258 
Conflicts over logistical details have also played a role in the failures of 
sentencing commission initiatives. In a 2013 interview, Democratic Assembly 
Member Tom Ammiano, chair of the Assembly Public Safety Committee, 
chalked up some of the past failures to disagreements over who should sit on the 
sentencing commission.259 For instance, the 2007 Senate Bill, which ultimately 
died in the Assembly, as discussed earlier, almost didn’t make it out of the Senate 
in the first place due to contentious debates over the proposed commission’s 
membership.260 
Personal grudges and conflicts over the membership of a sentencing 
commission have contributed to some of the failed efforts in recent years. But 
more important have been Democratic lawmakers’ fears of being viewed by their 
constituents as soft on crime.261 Many Democratic legislators perceive 
 
http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2009/08 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Legislative 
Republicans, police chiefs and district attorneys have come out swinging against . . . the creation of an 
appointed commission with the power to rewrite sentencing guidelines.”). 
256. Matthew Yi, Prison Bill Gutted by State Assembly, SFGATE.COM (Aug. 28, 2009), 
http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2009/08/am-alert-prison.html (“The [Assembly’s] version of the . . . 
plan eliminates several key . . . elements, including the creation of a sentencing commission . . . “); see also 
Maureen Cavanaugh & Hank Crook, Sacramento Update: Reducing Calif. Prison Population, KPBS.ORG 
(Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2009/sep/01/sacramento-update-reducing-calif-prison-population 
(calling the Assembly’s amended bill, without the sentencing commission, “prison reform lite”). 
257. Michael Rothfeld, Gov. Schwarzenegger Calls Assembly Gutless on Prisons, LATIMES.COM (Aug. 
26, 2009, 2:49 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/08/governor-calls-assembly-lawmakers-
gutless-on-prisons.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
258. Matthew Yi, Schwarzenegger to State Assembly: Have Some Guts, SFGATE.COM (Aug. 26, 2009, 
12:50 PM), http://blog.sfgate.com/nov05election/2009/08/26/schwarzenegger-to-state-assembly-have-some-
guts/#ixzz0PLn8FTTB (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
259. Jeremy B. White, California Sentencing Commission Could Be Coming, Ammiano Says, 
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themselves, correctly or incorrectly,262 to have less political capital than 
Republicans when it comes to sentencing reform.263 Furthermore, many 
Democrats who perhaps might have been brave enough to “spend” their limited 
political capital to support a sentencing commission are deterred by groups like 
the CDAA, which portray sentencing commissions as unconstitutional264 and a 
threat to public safety.265 Indeed, the party is not likely to back sweeping reform 
without significant Republican support. As noted by Professor Garrick Percival, 
“Republican intransigence has implications for Democrats’ positioning on 
crime . . . . Experience in other states indicates that if Republicans don’t join in, 
Democrats get skittish.”266 
Can California’s Democrats overcome their fear of appearing soft on crime, 
as they appeared ready to do in 2007, when the Democrats in both the Senate and 
Assembly passed their own versions of a sentencing commission bill (but then 
failed to enact the other house’s bill)? The 2007 effort got off the ground in part 
because Governor Schwarzenegger, a Republican, had publicly endorsed the idea 
of a sentencing commission, thereby giving political cover to the Democratic 
legislators.267 However, even in the absence of a Republican governor’s support, a 
sentencing commission may be possible. AB 1633, mentioned earlier,268 was 
introduced during the 2013-14 legislative term and would have turned the Board 
of State and Community Corrections (BSCC), a body created in 2012 to help 
implement Realignment,269 into an advisory sentencing commission (in addition 
to the BSCC’s other duties).270 The bill made it through the Assembly Committee 
on Public Safety and made it through the Committee on Appropriations on 
November 30. But it failed to pass.271 
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15, at 2. 
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While Democrats may still fear taking on wholesale reform, as developed 
below, initiatives over the past decade or more may change the equation 
somewhat.272 Or then again, they may not.273 
B. The Voters 
In recent years, the voters have been out in front of the legislature in 
supporting legislation to reduce some of the most extreme effects of the overly 
harsh laws put in place over the past 30 plus years. For example, in 2000, the 
voters adopted Proposition 36, mandating drug treatment instead of prison time 
for some drug offenders.274 In 2012, they adopted another Proposition 36, 
enacting modest reforms to California’s three strikes law.275 And most recently, 
the voters adopted Proposition 47, reducing a number of felonies to 
misdemeanors, in effect, limiting where those offenders serve their jail time.276 
This pattern has led many observers to suggest that voters are ready for broader 
reforms.277 
No doubt, the recent past suggests a change in the attitude of California 
voters. But voters are fickle: between passage of the two Proposition 36s, voters 
rejected a more sweeping reform to three strikes than the second Proposition 
36.278 And 72% of those who voted in 1994 supported three strikes,279 without 
fully understanding its sweeping implications.280 
The voters deserve mixed reviews with regard to their role in reforming 
California’s sentencing scheme. The good news is that voters’ willingness to 
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§§ 7599–7599.2; PENAL § 1170.1; and codified as amended PENAL §§ 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 496, 666, 8; 
HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 11350, 11357, 11377 (West Supp. 2014)). 
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L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2014, 6:13 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-ff-pol-proposition47-
20141106-story.html#page=1 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting attorney Michael Romano) 
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sentences or long felony sentences for these types of crime”); see Erika Aguilar, Election 2014: Prop 47 
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278. Proposition 66, initiative (Cal. 2004); Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 1, at 916.  
279. See The Field Poll’s Record in Measuring Statewide Ballot Propositions in California (1994-
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reform harsh sentencing practices may embolden legislators to take on the task at 
a broader level. Professor Zimring made a related point in connection with the 
voters’ rejection of Proposition 34 in 2012.281 He argued that the close vote, 52%-
48%, might embolden politicians to take on the issue because it signaled a shift 
in public sentiment on the death penalty.282 
While the voters seem to have gotten out in front of the legislature on 
reforming sentencing laws, the use of the initiative process creates two problems: 
one, letting voters adopt reforms may give legislators a disincentive to take on 
wholesale reform. The situation is like old ad for breakfast cereal featuring three 
small children; one of the older children turns to the other and says, “Let's get 
Mikey [to try it].”283 Or as argued by the proponents of Proposition 47, legislators 
are “comfortable with adding new crimes and increasing sentences,” but are 
“generally incapable of lowering them in the face of pressure from law 
enforcement and victims’ interest groups, even when overwhelming evidence 
points to better safety, greater savings and other positive outcomes from 
decreased penalties.”284 
Two, the use of the initiative process has created an unmanageable 
patchwork of sentencing provisions that only compounds the complexity of the 
sentencing scheme in California.285 For example, the Three Strikes initiative, 
requiring a super-majority in the legislature to effectuate reform, has resulted in 
overuse of incarceration for many felons.286 While Proposition 36 relieved some 
of the pressure created by the original law, it left intact many of the draconian 
sentences and did nothing to address the law’s more sweeping effects created by 
its two-strike provisions.287 Proposition 47 is more of the same: it relieves some 
of the pressure by re-characterizing various low-level felonies as 
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misdemeanors.288 But critics have raised various concerns regarding whether the 
law went too far in transforming some crimes as misdemeanors.289 While some of 
the criticisms are the usual ones from law enforcement and district attorneys,290 
they raise some concerns about over-breadth of the reform provisions that may 
indeed come to pass.291 
Unlike systematic reform, the current sentencing provisions demonstrate 
incoherence philosophically.292 California law sometimes furthers retributivist 
goals, while at others, the goal of incapacitation, and yet at other times, 
rehabilitation.293 That often results in unequal treatment of offenders who 
otherwise seem similarly situated.294 The concern with the lack of coherence is 
not merely theoretical: the patchwork sentencing scheme today prevents 
authorities from releasing some low-risk offenders, like elderly prisoners who 
have aged out of their high crime years and may be so physically incapacitated 
that they cannot commit serious crimes.295 They may not be subject to release 
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release of third strike felons. In the campaign literature opposing Proposition 47, opponents argued that the law 
would allow release of felons with prior convictions for certain serious felonies. See, e.g., Prop 47 Facts, 
ALLIANCE FOR A SAFER CAL., http://www.votenoprop47.org/No_On_Prop_47__Facts.html (last visited Dec. 
24, 2014) [hereinafter Prop 47 Facts] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); No on 47, supra note 289. 
While that is only partially true (courts do not have to release all such felons), often aging felons no longer 
represent a continued threat to public safety, as is now widely recognized by those interested in sentencing 
reform. See Priority Issues: Prisons, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/priority-issues/prisons/ 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Priority Issues] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also 
ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 12, at 7. 
291. At least as argued by Proposition 47 opponents, under current law, convicted felons cannot possess 
handguns in California, but by changing street crimes like purse-snatching and certain burglaries into 
misdemeanors, Prop 47 makes it impossible to stop criminals convicted of these and many other offenses from 
having guns. Prop 47 Facts, supra note 290. Additionally, Prop 47 will redefine grand theft, so that it will only 
be considered a felony if the value of the gun is greater than $950. No on 47, supra note 289. Almost all guns 
are below $950 and the people steal guns to commit other crimes. Id. 
292. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 1, at 917. 
293. Vitiello, supra note 38, at 423–26. 
294. Frank Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government, and the Decline of Expert Authority: Some 
Reflections on “Three Strikes” in California, 28 PAC. L.J. 243, 248–251 (1996). 
295. INMATE/PAROLEE POPULATION, supra note 37 (“Statistics published by the U.S. Department of 
Justice indicate that recidivism drops significantly as inmates age—from over 50-percent nationally for inmates 
between ages 18 and 29 to about 2-percent for inmates aged 55 or older.”); Jamie Fellner, Frail and Elderly 
Prisoners: Do They Still Belong Behind Bars?, THE CRIME REPORT (May 29, 2012, 4:38 AM), 
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because they have been incarcerated under the three strikes law.296 At the same 
time, younger more dangerous offenders may remain on the streets because of 
changes brought about by Proposition 47297 or because they were sentenced under 
laws allowing judges greater discretion than does the three strikes law.298 
Elsewhere, that kind of poor allocation of resources has resulted in 
sentencing reform.299 That concern, of course, is why symposia like this one stay 
in business. 
C. The Rhino in the Room 
When it comes to sentencing legislation, including passage of three strikes, 
the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) is the 
rhinoceros300 in the room. Its role in passing three strikes has been documented by 
many writers.301 Under its most famous and powerful president, Don Novey, the 
union grew in influence through discipline and a huge war chest.302 Politicians 
from both parties paid homage to Novey, including former Governor Gray 
Davis.303 For over thirty years, the CCPOA spent huge sums supporting laws 
requiring enhanced sentences.304 Not only did it spend huge sums, but it had a 
remarkable success rate: when it backed a candidate or issue, the union seldom 
 
http://www.thecrimereport.org/ viewpoints/2012-05-frail-and-elderly-prisoners-do-they-still-belong-beh (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
296. News Release, Stan. News Serv., Elderly Prisoners to Pose Major Problems Under Three-Strikes-
Law, (Nov. 2, 1994), available at http://news.stanford.edu/pr/94/941102Arc4063.html (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review); Josh Brooks, Three Strikes for Aging Inmates, THE 2X2 PROJECT (Nov. 5, 2012), 
http://the2x2project.org/three-strikes-against-aging-inmates/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
297. See Rick Montanez, Arguments Heading Up in Penalty-Reducing Prop 47, ABC 30 (Sept. 18, 2014), 
http://abc30.com/politics/arguments-heating-up-in-penalty-reducing-prop-47/315332/ (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
298. A Primer: Three StrikesCThe Impact After More Than a Decade, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (Oct. 
2005), http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3_strikes/3_strikes_102005.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
299. Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 18, at 1299; MICHAEL LEACHMAN ET AL., CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, IMPROVING BUDGET ANALYSIS OF STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS: A 
STRATEGY FOR BETTER OUTCOMES AND SAVING MONEY 1 (2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-11-
12sfp.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
300. Apart from the fact that “the elephant in the room” is a cliché, the hackneyed phrase does not capture 
the power of the CCPOA. Fading are the Peacemakers, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www. 
economist.com/node/15580530 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
301. See Vitiello, supra note 29, at 1662–63; Peter H. Kyle, Contracting for Performance: Restructuring 
the Private Prison Market, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2087, 2104 (2013); Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment 
and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 501 (2005); see also JOSHUA PAGE, THE TOUGHEST BEAT: POLITICS, 
PUNISHMENT, AND THE PRISON OFFICERS UNION IN CALIFORNIA 7 (2011). 
302. Vitiello, Alternatives to Incaraceration, supra note 18, at 1306–07. 
303. See id. 
304. Id. at 1306–10; Kyle, supra note 301, at 2104; Dolovich, supra note 301, at 532–33. 
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lost.305 Given its track record, one must ask whether the union retains its clout and 
whether it will work to frustrate sentencing reform. 
Over the past decade, I have attended events with high-ranking members of 
the union. Representatives seemed genuinely interested in sentencing reform. 
Indeed, the union seems to have adopted a new position on sentencing laws. 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, the 
CCPOA released a report recommending reforms to the state’s prison system.306 
The report recognized that prison overcrowding jeopardizes the safety of guards 
and prisoners.307 Not surprisingly, the report recommended more prison 
construction and an expanded work force, but it also included recommendations 
for rehabilitation and re-entry programs.308 Importantly, it supported the creation 
of a sentencing commission.309 
Perhaps more surprisingly, the CCPOA took no official position on 
Realignment.310 The shift in inmates has an effect on union jobs as the prison 
population shrinks.311 Despite Republicans’ efforts to show that Realignment has 
caused harm to public safety,312 CCPOA has indicated tacit support for the law.313 
The leadership that took over after Don Novey retired has been supportive of 
rehabilitative efforts.314 That includes recently retired president Mike Jimenez and 
his replacement, Chuck Alexander.315 
 
305. See Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 18, at 1307; see generally CAL. CORR. PEACE 
OFFICERS ASS’N, NEW DIRECTIONS: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING CALIFORNIA’S PRISON SYSTEM TO 
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306. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 305, at 2.  
307. Id. 
308. Id. at 8–10. 
309. Id. at 7–8. 
310. See generally CAL. CORR. PEACE OFFICERS ASS’N, LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 6–7 (2011), available at 
http://www.ccpoa.org/files/ccpoalegoctreport.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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inmates in state prisons would lead to layoffs of prison guards and staff. See Letter from Chuck Alexander, 
CCPOA Executive Vice President, to State Board (Oct. 3, 2011), available at http://www.ccpoa.org/files/ 
100311_AB109_Memo.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing “the impact on facility staffing 
that is anticipated due to AB109 and the corresponding reductions in inmate population.”). 
312. See, e.g., AB 109’S MOST WANTED, supra note 214 (providing links to news articles about various 
convicted felons who allegedly harmed new victims as a result of AB 109). 
313. See, e.g., CCPOA’s web site, www.CCPOA.org, which features a mix of postings both supporting 
the positive effects of realignment. CAL. CORR. PEACE OFFICER’S ASS’N, http://www.CCPOA.org (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2015). One recent post cited a study that showed realignment has not led to increased crime, and 
criticizing other aspects. Id. For instance, the site features a number of articles about inmates who were released 
pursuant to AB 109 and then went on to commit violent crimes. Id. 
314. Mr. Jimenez took over as president when Don Novey retired in 2002; in contrast to Mr. Novey’s 
tenure, which saw the union vehemently fighting against any attempt to reform Three Strikes, CCPOA under 
Mr. Jimenez took donated no money to and took no position on Proposition 36, which reformed the law. Jon 
Ortiz, Long-Time Prison Officers’ Union President to Retire, SACBEE.COM (Sept. 26, 2014, 11:50 AM), 
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More evidence of a real change in the CCPOA can be found: for example, 
the union did not contribute to efforts to defeat Proposition 34 in 2012.316 Prop 34 
would have abolished the death penalty in California.317 While the union has 
continued to support individual candidates, the union has largely foresworn 
involvement in the initiative process.318 
One can speculate about the motivation for the CCPOA’s change in 
direction. Surely, its current leadership may recognize the risks associated with 
its image as a ruthless and intimidating political force.319 For now, the new-look 
union is good news for sentencing reform efforts. Keeping the CCPOA on the 
sidelines increases chances of legislative reform. Active involvement by the 
union supporting reform would be an unexpected bonanza for reform. 
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com/blog/2012/10/22/calif-prison-guard-union-keeping-quiet-o (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“In a 
bygone era, the [CCPOA] would have unleashed a campaign carpet-bombing . . . . But this year CCPOA has 
spent relatively little on politics. It hasn’t even taken a stand on the three-strikes measure, Proposition 36.”). 
317. Proposition 34, initiative (Cal. 2012). 
318. For instance, in 2012, CCPOA gave no money whatsoever to opposing Proposition 34, which would 
have abolished the death penalty in California, nor Proposition 36, which reformed the Three Strikes Law. 
Ortiz, supra note 316; see Schackford, supra note 316 and accompanying text. The only donation CCPOA has 
made toward supporting or opposing any ballot measure in the last five years was a donation made to the 
committee “Californians to Protect Schools, Universities, & Public Safety,” whose purpose was to campaign for 
the passage of Proposition 30, which authorized temporary tax increases to fund education in California. 
California Correctional Peace Officers Association Contributions to Candidates and Committees, NAT’L INST. 
ON MONEY IN ST. POLITICS, http://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?d-eid=3286#[{4|{1|gro=m-t-eid,y (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2015) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
319. See Undue Influence: the Power of Police and Prison Guards’ Unions, RADIOPROJECT.ORG (Aug. 7, 
2012), http://www.radioproject.org/2012/08/undue-influence-the-power-of-police-and-prison-guards-unions (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting Dan Macallair, Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice) 
(“[CCPOA] achieved everything they thought they wanted, but they did it at great cost. They did it at the cost of 
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D. The California District Attorneys Association 
As suggested by proponents of Proposition 47, legislators of both parties rely 
on support from law enforcement organizations.320 That includes the California 
District Attorneys Association (CDAA).321 
Despite having initially opposed the passage of three strikes in 1994, the 
CDAA has fought against attempts to reform three strikes,322 including SB 1642, 
which would have required that a third strike be a violent or serious felony (as 
Proposition 36 eventually did). The CDAA expressed strong opposition and was 
accused of “blatantly misrepresenting the contents” of SB 1642 so as to scare the 
public into pressuring their representatives to vote against the bill, which 
ultimately failed to pass.323 
CDAA also fought against Proposition 36 in 2012.324 Individual DAs split on 
the measure, with some, such as then DA of Los Angeles County Steve Cooley,325 
 
320. See supra note 290 and accompanying text. For example, as with any criticism of three strikes, 
opponents of reform overstate concerns about the release of third strike felons. In the campaign literature 
opposing Proposition 47, critics argued that the law would allow the release of felons with prior convictions for 
certain serious felonies. See Prop 47 Facts, supra note 290; No on 47, supra note 289. While that is only 
partially true (courts do not have to release all such felons), often aging felons no longer represent a continued 
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323. SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 1642, 2006 Leg. (Cal. 2006), available at http://leginfo. 
ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_1601-1650/sb_1642_cfa_20060526_103948_sen_floor.html (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review); Chris Levister, Sen. Romero’s Three Strikes Reform Act Shelved, BLACK VOICE NEWS 
(June 15, 2006, 1:15 PM), http://www.blackvoicenews.com/more-sections/business/39575-sen-romeros-three-
strikes-reform-act-shelved.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
324. Raheem F. Hosseini, California’s Proposition 34 and Proposition 36 Expose Red Meat in a Blue 
State, SACRAMENTO NEWS & REV. (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.newsreview.com/sacramento/californias-
proposition-34-proposition/content?oid=7873328 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
325. Cooley had supported previous efforts to reform Three Strikes and even coauthored the Three 
Strikes Reform Act of 2006, which, similar to Proposition 36 six years later, would have made Three Strikes 
applicable only to serious or violent felonies. Kenneth Ofgang, Steve Cooley, County’s Second-Longest Serving 
D.A. Takes Pride in Record, Looks to Future, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE (Jan. 14, 2010) 
http://www.metnews.com/articles/2010/cooley011410.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Conflict 
with CDAA over his co-authorship and support of the Three Strikes Reform Act led to Cooley leaving the 
group. Id. The CDAA removed Cooley from its board as a result of his support for Proposition 36. See Romero, 
Cooley Heading for Another Try on Three Strikes, CAPITOL WEEKLY (July 27, 2006), 
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supporting it, while others, such as Jan Scully, then DA of Sacramento County, 
strongly opposing it.326 The CDAA joined the latter camp, arguing that 
Proposition 36 “would create serious risks to public safety” by weakening “a 
valuable, essential, and proven tool in the fight against crime.”327 
Three strikes is not the only area of sentencing reform in which the CDAA 
has remained active, although there are a few reform measures that the group has 
not opposed. For instance, the CDAA took no position on SB 1010, the Fair 
Sentencing Act,328 which eliminated the crack/powder cocaine sentencing 
disparity under California law.329 The CDAA’s neutrality on the bill contrasted 
with its opposition of a similar cocaine sentencing reform effort in the 2000s, as 
well as with opposition to SB 1010 by police officers’ unions.330 
But the CDAA by and large has continued to oppose efforts to reform harsh 
sentencing laws. For example, in 2013 it spoke out against SB 649, which would 
have given prosecutors and judges discretion to charge as misdemeanors the 
possession of certain drugs that were being charged as felonies331 (and still are--
the bill passed both the Senate and Assembly, but Governor Brown vetoed it).332 
The California Judges Association, Right on Crime, the California Civil Rights 
Coalition, the ACLU, and various other groups supported the measure; the 
CDAA joined groups like the Police Chiefs Association, Sheriffs Association, 
and Narcotics Officers Association in voicing opposition. The CDAA argued that 
sentences for drug possession were appropriately harsh and that allowing more 
drug possession cases to be charged as misdemeanors would unduly burden 
county jails.333 
The CDAA also opposed Proposition 47--not surprising, since the measure 
goes further than SB 649 would have, not merely giving local officials discretion 
 
326.  Hosseini, supra note 324. 
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wegmanlevin.com/wp-content/uploads/wl-content/SB649.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) [hereinafter SB 649] 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review); HEARING ON SB 649 BEFORE THE ASSEMB. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, 
2013 Leg. (Cal. 2013), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0601-0650/sb_649_cfa_ 
20130612_155938_asm_comm.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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to charge certain felonies as misdemeanors, but redefining certain felonies as 
misdemeanors for all offenders.334 The CDAA has called Proposition 47 “a cruel 
fraud,” and claimed that it was “crafted to weaken criminal laws,” resulting in 
“many potentially violent individuals” being released into communities across 
the state.335 
The CDAA has also supported efforts to roll back previous reforms. In 2013, 
the CDAA sponsored and co-sponsored bills in the Assembly and Senate that 
would send back to state prison offenders diverted to county jails under 
Realignment.336 One such bill was AB 222, which would have required certain 
felony drug offenders sent to county jail under Realignment to instead serve their 
sentences in state prison.337 The CDAA, the bill’s chief sponsor, argued that the 
bill was necessary in order to ease the burden placed on county jails by 
Realignment.338 
Sentencing reform is likely to limit prosecutorial discretion.339 As a result, the 
CDAA is not likely to endorse sweeping reform that shifts power to a 
commission340 and back to judges.341 The challenge for reformers will be to get 
comprehensive reform adopting best practices through the legislature or voters 
with the CDAA’s opposition.342 
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_20130612_155938_asm_comm.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating the California Public 
Defenders Association supported SB 649). With increasing limitations on judicial discretion, judges 
 
2014 / Reforming California Sentencing Practice and Policy 
726 
E. The Good Guys 
Judges Reinhardt, Karlton, and Henderson have been accused of judicial 
activism by some conservatives.343 Indeed, one sharp-penned critic has stated that 
“President Carter’s sorry judicial legacy lives on.”344 (All of the judges are Carter 
appointees and no doubt ended up hearing the prison cases by clever forum 
shopping by the plaintiffs’ lawyers). I offer a different view: California owes 
them a full-throated thank you. 
The persistent efforts of the three-judge panel have resulted in the reforms 
that California has in place to date.345 Some conservative scholars question 
whether unelected federal judges’ intervention prevents political reforms from 
taking hold.346 Proving that California could not have gotten as far as it has 
without judicial intervention may not be possible. I confess that I lack the 
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because they have been branded ‘factual findings’ entitled to deferential review, the policy preferences of three 
District Judges now govern the operation of California’s penal system.”). 
344. Whelan, supra note 343. 
345. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.  
346. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by 
Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1312 (2005) (“Roe essentially declared a winner in one of 
the most difficult and divisive public law debates of American history. Don’t bother going to state legislatures 
to reverse that decision. Don’t bother trying to persuade your neighbors (unless your neighbor is Justice 
Powell). Roe was a threat to our democracy because it raised the stakes of an issue where primordial loyalties 
ran deep.”) 
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empirical training to attempt such proof. But I am convinced that their efforts 
have been essential to bringing the state close to meaningful reform. 
I premise my faith on two things: one is a political reality that prisoners do 
not produce much sympathy among politicians and voters. They lack resources to 
buy access and they usually cannot vote even after their release because they are 
ex-felons.347 Inclusion of felons in political advertising usually produces longer 
prison sentences, not political reforms.348 
The second reality relates to California politics. As discussed increasingly 
often today, conservative states have achieved a variety of sentencing reforms, 
typically through the democratic process.349 That might support the argument that 
the three-judge panel’s involvement has slowed democratic reform. Elsewhere, I 
have argued against that conclusion: instead, there are unique aspects of 
California’s political dynamics that explain why reform has not been the result of 
legislative reform.350 
Contrary to claims of “judicial lawlessness,” the three-judge panel has acted 
with restraint. As developed by my colleague Brian Landsberg, federal law 
 
347. See, e.g., How Inmates Launched a Statewide Hunger Strike from Solitary, NPR (Mar. 6, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/03/06/286794055/how-four-inmates-launched-a-statewide-hunger-strike-from-solitary 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (in order to organize a hunger strike to protest conditions of solitary 
confinement, it took four alleged gang leaders five years to “come to see their fight as fundamentally with the 
system itself rather than fundamentally with each other.”); Jessica Feierman, Creative Prison Lawyering: From 
Silence to Democracy, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249, 249 (2004) (stating that “[i]n correctional 
facilities across the country, prisoners learn to turn away from civic participation. Not only are they physically 
separated from family and friends, but their voices are silenced; they are often denied access to law libraries and 
the courts, barred from voting, restricted in their access to the media, and subjected to a severely hierarchical 
structure of power in their daily lives.”). Additionally, United States Attorney General Eric Holder has 
suggested reexamining disenfranchisement. Ryan J. Reilly, Eric Holder Backs Restoration of Voting Rights for 
Former Felons, HUFF. POST (Feb. 11, 2014, 9:30 AM), http://huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/11/eric-holder-felon-
voting_n_4762863.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
348. In 1988, during the presidential election, Republican strategist Lee Atwater created a television 
advertisement with the mug shot of Willie Horton, a prisoner who committed assault, armed robbery, and rape 
while he was released as part of a Massachusetts’s weekend furlough. Taibbi, supra note 285; see also Willie 
Horton 1988 Attack Ad, YOUTUBE (Uploaded on Nov. 8, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=Io9KMSSEZ0Y (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). This advertisement catalyzed the get-
tough-on-crime movement. Taibbi, supra note 285. In 2004, anti-Proposition 66 television advertisements ran 
similar to the 1988 Willie Horton advertisements, which showed the mug shots of criminals who would be 
released under Proposition 66. Id. The Proposition 66 advertisements aired a few weeks before the election 
shifted the debate and ultimately ending in the failure of Proposition 66. Mark Martin, Proposition 66: Efforts 
to Reform ‘Three Strikes” Law Likely to be on Ballot Again, S.F. GATE (Nov. 4, 2004), 
http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/PROPOSITION-66-Efforts-to-reform-three-2638541.php (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review). 
349. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. See also Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration, 
supra note 18, at 1291–94; BOGGS & WORTHY, supra note 52, at 6. 
350. Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration, supra  note 18, at 1305–06, 1312–13 (“[a] number of factors 
have coalesced over the past thirty years: anyone interested in identifying why California cannot reform its 
system should examine the role of the prison guards’ union, victim rights groups, myths surrounding the effects 
of Three Strikes, [] term limits . . . [and redistricting laws]”). 
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allowing for structural injunctions may give judges broad power, but that power 
must be used sparingly.351 As demonstrated during the Civil Rights Era, federal 
courts are dependent on a willing executive to enforce their judgments.352 Further, 
having found constitutional violations in the prison health care systems, the 
three-judge panel has worked with the state, for example, by repeatedly 
extending time limits for compliance with the judges’ orders.353 The judges have 
done so for a number of reasons, no doubt, including limited power to enforce 
their orders.354 Jailing a sitting governor for contempt for failing to comply with a 
federal court order is unlikely.355 No doubt, some of the judges’ restraint has been 
the product of limited legal remedies and the probable political backlash if they 
used their full powers.356 At the same time, they have used their limited powers to 
force the state to act.357 
As many commentators358 have urged, the most effective wholesale reform 
remedy would be the adoption of a sentencing commission, with responsibility to 
 
351. See Brian K. Landsberg, Enforcing Desegregation: A Case Study of Federal District Court Power 
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352. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 323 
(1999) (“[J]udicial independence . . . is meaningless unless the executive branch is willing and able to enforce 
the orders of federal courts.”); see also Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 994 (1996). 
353. See, e.g., Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK DAD (PC) (E.D. Cal. Jul. 03, 2014), available 
at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3JP-July-2014/Three-Judge-Court-grants-two-month-extension.pdf (on 
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2014.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
354. Maureen Cavanaugh, et al., Supreme Court Orders California to Release Thousands of Prisoners, 
KPBS (May 23, 2011), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2011/may/23/supreme-court-orders-california-release-
thousands-/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
355. The three-judge panel threatened to hold Governor Brown and other officials in contempt of court. 
Chris Megerian, Judges Threaten Gov. Jerry Brown with Contempt of Court, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/11/local/la-me-prisons-20130412 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
Governor Brown stated he would “litigate until the Supreme Court tells us that we’re not on the right track.” 
Chris Megerian & Paige St. John, Gov. Jerry Brown Vows Fight with Judges Over Prisons, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 
12, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/12/local/la-me-ff-brown-prisons-20130413 (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
356. For example, during desegregation, Alabama Governor George C. Wallace declared “I say 
segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever,” and vowed to fight the federal government and 
federal courts. Landsberg, supra note 351, at 876. Governor Wallace, who had gained national notoriety and 
approval in Alabama, later issued an executive order delaying the opening of school subject to court ordered 
desegregation. Id. at 875. During this time the court “simultaneously showed restraint and deference to the State 
officials while also enjoining them from interfering with the school desegregation anywhere in the state.” Id. at 
882. 
357. For example, in response to Alabama Governor George C. Wallace’s interference with 
desegregation, the federal courts appointed the United States as a party and later issued injunctions preventing 
Governor Wallace’s interference. Landsberg, supra note 351, at 873, 877. 
358.  Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 1, at 908, 959–60 (“The trade winds may now be shifting in favor of a 
more dispassionate and empirically grounded discussion of sentencing policy in California.”); Vitiello, supra 
note 38, at 461; Model Penal Code: Sentencing Tentative Draft No. 3, AM. L. INST. (2014). But see Ball, supra 
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determine the most effective way to use prison resources and with the job of 
rationalizing California’s sentencing scheme.359 Over the past two decades, 
California’s legislature has been resistant to the idea, despite having various 
proposals in the hopper.360 Unwilling to adopt such a widely adopted solution,361 
California may now be open to adoption of a sentencing commission as part of 
long-term reforms because the three-judge panel is pushing for such a solution.362 
While the judges lack effective enforcement power to compel the legislature to 
act, they have made clear that a commission should be part of a wholesale 
remedy. As stated most recently in their February 10, 2014 order extending time 
 
note 179, at 1003 (arguing sentencing commissions do not adequately address the differences between local 
governments). 
359. See Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 1, at 964–65; Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA 
L. REV. 715, 784–87 (2005); Robert Weisberg, How Sentencing Commissions Turned Out to Be a Good Idea, 
12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 179, 210 (2007). 
360. Since the 1970s, at least nine bills were introduced for a state sentencing commission. Kara Dansky, 
Understanding California Sentencing, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 45, 73 (2008). Recently, Senator Darrel Steinberg 
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commission-included-in-prison-order-20140210-story.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
361. A Sentencing Commission for California, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2014/03/10/opinion/a-sentencing-commission-for-california.html (on file with the McGeorge Law 
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Sometimes the Cure is Worse than the Disease: The One-Way White-Collar Sentencing Ratchet, HUM. RIGHTS 
MAGAZINE HOME (Summer 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights 
_magazine_home/human_rights_vol38_2011/human_rights_summer11/sometimes_the_cure_is_worse_than_th
e_disease_the_one-way_white-collar_sentencing_ratchet.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(discussing that the Federal Sentencing Commission has been criticized for overusing incarceration to attack 
crime); William Ray Price, Jr., Chief Justice Delivers 2010 State of the Judiciary Address, YOUR MISSOURI CT. 
(Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=36875 (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (criticizing Missouri for over-incarcerating nonviolent offenders). But elsewhere, many states have 
used commissions with considerable success, both in limiting prison costs and maintaining public safety. See, 
e.g., New York Leading Way on Prison Reform, NEWSDAY (Mar. 13, 2014, 6:41 PM), http://www.newsday. 
com/opinion/new-york-leading-way-on-prison-reform-editorial-1.7384167 (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (noting that New York’s scaling back of mandatory minimum prison time “salvage[s] lives, save[s] 
money, and make[s] the [] criminal justice system fairer and more effective.”); Kala Kachmar, Sentencing 
Reform has Slowed, Not Stopped, Inmate Growth, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Oct. 19, 2014, 8:36 AM), 
http://www.montgomery advertiser.com/story/news/2014/10/19/sentencing-reform-has-slowed-not-stopped-
inmate-growth/17530207/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing that Alabama’s sentencing 
commission has led to decreases in prison sentences and length of prison sentences); see also Michael Tonry, 
The Politics and Processes of Sentencing Commission, 37 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 307, 307 (2006). 
362. Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK DAD (PC), at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014), available 
at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3jp-Feb-2014/Three-Judge-Court-opinion-2-20-2014.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (“[D]efendants have agreed to develop comprehensive and sustainable prison 
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for compliance with their order to reduce the total prison population to 137.5% of 
capacity, they stated: 
. . . [W]e have consistently demanded a “durable” solution to California 
prison overcrowding . . . 
. . . [B]elated as it may be, defendants appear to be prepared to take the 
necessary steps toward achieving a durable solution . . . [During the two-
year extension to comply with the court’s order] defendants have agreed 
to develop comprehensive and sustainable prison population-reduction 
reforms, including considering the establishment of a commission to 
recommend reforms of state penal and sentencing laws.363 
The judges’ order makes clear one path towards long-term compliance, a 
path that would bring California in line with successful reforms elsewhere.364 
From my perspective, this is a textbook example of the value of an 
independent judiciary. But despite claims of their critics about abuse of power, 
federal judges are constrained by a host of limitations on their power as discussed 
above (and in my colleague Brian Landsberg’s paper).365 Lacking power to 
compel the legislature to pass legislation, including an act creating a sentencing 
commission, the three-judge panel may ultimately fail if other actors frustrate 
their order. 
V. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: WELL, ARE WE THERE YET?  
The three-judge panel has signaled that California should adopt a sentencing 
commission as a long term solution to prison overcrowding.366 That remains the 
best hope for reform that has otherwise proven to be so difficult.367 Recent efforts 
in the legislature suggest that California’s politicians see the need for reform.368 
As a result, I am reasonably optimistic that California will adopt broader reform 
than it has been able to do so in the past decades. 
 
363. Id. at *2–3. 
364. Id. at *2 (“Instead, defendants have continually failed to implement any of the measures approved by 
this Court and the Supreme Court that would have safely reduced the California prison population and 
alleviated the unconstitutional conditions of medical and mental health care in the prisons.”). 
365. Landsberg, supra note 351, at 867. 
366. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.  
367. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 18, at 
1286–87. Typically, the goals for commissions included reducing reliance on incarceration as the only response 
to crime, thereby reducing prison costs, and using existing resources more effectively for violent offenders, 
thereby protecting the public without continuous prison construction. 
368. See, e.g., ASSEMB. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF AB 1633, 2013-2014 Sess. (Cal. 
2014), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
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But that only evokes other questions. As Professor Petersilia has argued, 
reform for its own sake is not the goal.369 Instead, the critical question is whether 
California will get it right. Putting in place a sentencing commission does not 
automatically produce good results.370 Providing a commission with too little 
authority may invite legislative interference that may result in excessive 
sentences not justified by the need for public safety.371 The legislature was for so 
long addicted to sentence enhancements in the past three decades to suggest the 
need for a buffer between the political process and the use of prison resources.372 
At the same time, reform that merely creates a revolving door that allows 
dangerous felons to return to the street create the seeds of their own failure. 
Indeed, many Republican legislators responded to passage of Realignment by 
creating a website to report crimes committed by offenders on the streets as a 
result of the new law.373 No doubt, they are waiting to cudgel Democratic 
supporters of Realignment in the next election. Doing reform poorly may give 
Republicans fodder to cut back reform efforts. 
As many of the articles in this symposium demonstrate, creative people in 
various disciplines have effectuated meaningful change that reduces 
incarceration, reduces recidivism, and reduces costs without endangering public 
safety.374 For over a decade, a committee of the American Law Institute has been 
working on reforming the sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code.375 It 
has created a draft of a sentencing commission based on best practices from 
around the country, adopting provisions that have worked elsewhere.376 Given 
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370.  See Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative 
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(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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McGeorge Law Review). 
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how late California has been to adopt wholesale reform, it does not have to 
invent an approach to reform. 
Simply viewing the recent past, including failed efforts to adopt broad 
sentencing reform, might leave one with little confidence. And as developed 
above, legislators and the governor have incentives and disincentives to reform 
the system.377 The voters have a mixed record in effectuating reform. So what is 
the best case scenario for meaningful reform? 
1. The three-judge panel must keep pressure on the state to reform its 
sentencing system. The worst case would be for the court to dissolve the 
injunction when the state reduces the prison population to 137.5% of capacity 
and allow the state to go back to its old habits. Given the court’s order and the 
governor’s commitment to considering a sentencing commission, the three-judge 
panel is already aware of the risks of bowing out too early. 
2. In an ideal world, some Republicans, perhaps from competitive districts 
created by the bi-partisan commission, will adopt the call of national Republicans 
to making sentencing reform a campaign issue.378 On occasion, California 
Republicans acknowledge the need to be for some big ideas, rather than simply 
opposing Democratic initiatives.379 Could it happen in California? 
3. Democrats and the voters acting alone have not done a good job of 
reforming California’s sentencing scheme.380 While I posed the possibility that 
the initiative process has relieved Democrats from doing the heavy lifting,381 the 
best case for California may be the use of the initiative process. Specifically, 
without a supermajority in the legislature, Democrats cannot reform three strikes, 
which is a major source of prison overcrowding.382 And as discussed above, many 
Democrats have not been willing to take on sweeping reform.383 Placing an 
initiative on the ballot, and inviting the voters to adopt a sentencing commission 
(empowered to modify even three strikes sentences) may be the best way to 
capture the current reformist sentiment of the electorate and to give legislators 
political cover. 
 
377. See supra part IV.A.. 
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CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f) (West Supp. 2014). 
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What will happen over the next several years? I proved to be a mediocre 
prognosticator almost twenty years ago when I predicted that an economic 
downturn would force California to reform its sentencing384 and again a decade 
ago when I thought that we were almost there.385 I will, therefore, demur on 
making a prediction. I will part with this thought: while I hope to still be teaching 
in a decade, I hope that Clark and I do not have to organize another symposium 
on reforming California’s sentencing scheme in 2024. 
 
 
 
384. Vitiello, supra note 38, at 457 (“Despite significant increases in prison space during the 1980s and 
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385. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 1, at 908 (“The trade winds may now be shifting in favor of a more 
dispassionate and empirically grounded discussion of sentencing policy in California.”). 
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